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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MICHAEL F. GRINNELL, 
Claimant-Petitioner, 
vs. 
BOARD OF REVIEW OF THE INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION OF UTAH, DEPARTMENT OF 
EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, and MAY TRUCK-
ING COMPANY, 
Respondents. 
Case No. 860265 
Category 6 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The issue presented in this case is whether the Claimant-
Petitioner Michael F. Grinnell was properly denied unemployment 
insurance benefits under §35-4-5(b)(1), Utah Code Annotated 
1953, as amended (Laws of Utah, First Special Session, Chapter 
20, § 3 ) , on the grounds he was discharged from his employment 
with May Trucking Company for just cause or for an act or 
-1-
omission in connection with employment which was deliberate, 
willful or wanton and adverse to the employer's rightful inter-
ests . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action before the Supreme Court of the State 
of Utah pursuant to § 3 5 - 4 - 1 0 ( i ) , Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
seeking judicial review of the majority decision of the Board 
of Review, Industrial Commission of Utah, dated April 29, 1986, 
Case No. 86-BR-106 (See Appendix A ) , which reversed the deci-
sion of the Administrative Law Judge dated February 26, 1986, 
Case No. 86-A-563 (See Appendix B ) . The majority decision of 
the Board of Review denied benefits to the Claimant-Petitioner, 
Michael F. Grinnell, pursuant to §35-4-5(b)(1), Utah Code Anno-
tated 1953, as amended, on the grounds he was discharged from 
his employment with May Trucking Company, for "just cause" as 
that term has been construed and defined in the Unemployment 
Insurance Rules of the Utah Department of Employment Security 
of the Industrial Commission of Utah and by the Utah Supreme 
Court. (Statutes and Rules Applicable to the Case are cited 
in Appendix C and all "R" prefixed notations refer to pages 
from the record, and are duplicated in numerical order in Appen-
dix D.) 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Claimant-Petitioner, hereinafter referred to as "claim-
ant" worked as a tractor-trailer driver for May Trucking Company 
from September 20, 1984 to December 20, 1985, some one year and 
three months. R.0037 The claimant was a cross country driver 
and earned compensation of $.16 per mile. R.0037,0038 The 
claimant returned to the terminal of the employer, May Trucking 
Company, in Layton, Utah on December 20, 1985 (R.0055) after 
having been away from the terminal with the employer's truck on 
a road trip of approximately two weeks 1 duration. 
Upon claimant's return from the approximate two week road 
trip the employer discovered that the road speed governor on 
the claimant's truck had been altered. Claimant admitted that 
he had worked on the governor and in the process a valve was 
cracked and broken. R.0040 Claimant contended that an air 
line had broken while he was out on the road which necessitated 
that he make temporary repairs in order to prevent brake fail-
ure. R.0040 The employer contended that the claimant altered 
the speed governor on the truck in order to exceed the maximum 
speed allowed by the governor. 
The employer had in effect a policy providing in case of a 
mechanical failure or breakdown on the road the driver was to 
immediately notify the shop in Payette, Idaho to enable the 
-3-
employer to direct the driver to a shop to have the breakdown 
repaired. R.0040 It was made clear to the drivers that the 
driver is not to attempt to make the repair himself while on 
the road. The claimant was aware of the policy but did not 
call in to report the mechanical failure and did not offer an 
explanation as to his failure to report the breakdown. R.0042 
There was an on-board computer installed in the claimant's 
truck during the time period in question which computer dis-
closed that beginning on the 17th day of December of 1985 there 
were three extended periods of time when the claimant averaged 
66 miles per hour. R.0041 This occurred at the same time the 
speed governor was broken. 
The Rockwell Trip Master Computer installed on claimant's 
truck disclosed to the employer that on the 21st of November 
1985 the claimant began driving at 7:26 a.m. Between 7:26 a.m. 
November 21 and 6:52 a.m. the next day, November 22, the claim-
ant was actually at the wheel and driving the truck for a total 
of 21 hours and 23 minutes. This conduct of the claimant was 
grossly in violation of DOT regulations and the policy of the 
employer which limits a driver to drive no more than ten hours 
following eight consecutive hours off duty. R.0044 
The claimant submitted to a urinalysis test to determine 
whether or not there was any trace in his system of a controlled 
substance. The test was administered on December 24, 1985, four 
- 4 -
days after he had returned from his road trip. The results of 
the test showed the presence of traces of marijuana in the 
claimant's body. R.0046 Claimant admitted having used mari-
juana at some time in the past but denied smoking any marijuana 
while in control of any motor vehicle. R.0050 The employer 
contended that the testimony of the claimant proved he had used 
marijuana sometime during the two week period of time that he 
was on his last road trip. R.0063 The claimant denies having 
used marijuana during said two week period of time. R.0062 
The Board of Review found that the employer's decision to 
discharge the claimant was based upon a cumulation of factors, 
including the use of marijuana, and not based just upon the 
use of marijuana. R.0019,0020,0049 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
This Court has consistently held that the Commission's 
findings of fact are conclusive, binding on the Court, and to 
be sustained if supported by competent and substantial evidence 
in the record. With respect to mixed questions of law and fact 
the Court in reviewing agency decisions should afford consider-
able deference to the technical expertise and experience of the 
agency so long as these decisions fall within the limits of 
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reasonableness and rationality. As regards questions of law 
the Court's review is plenary with no deference accorded to the 
admin istrative determination. 
POINT II 
Claimant-Petitioner in his brief contends that "because of 
the technical experience of the ALJ and the ALJ's ability to 
more closely evaluate the testimony proffered, great deference 
should be afforded to the ALJ's decision." This does not mean 
that the Court should prefer the decision of the ALJ over the 
decision of the Board of Review. The decision of the Board of 
Review takes the place of the decision of the ALJ and becomes 
the decision of the Commission. The Supreme Court affords great 
deference to the technical expertise or more extensive experi-
ence of the agency, the decision of which in case of an appeal 
under the Employment Security Act, is rendered by the Board of 
Review. 
POINT III 
CLAIMANT ALTERED THE ROAD SPEED GOVERNOR 
The Board of Review found that the claimant intentionally 
altered the truck's road speed governor in order to drive in 
excess of the 62 mile per hour maximum speed the governor 
permitted. Testimony on this point is in dispute but it is 
submitted that the Board's decision is amply supported by sub-
stantial and competent evidence. The claimant admitted that 
he had worked on the governor. Claimant contended he had done 
so to repair an air leak which he was concerned would affect 
the brakes on the truck. The employer had a well-known policy 
that requires a driver anytime there is a mechanical failure or 
breakdown on the road to notify the employer's head of mainten-
ance in the shop in Payette, Idaho to be instructed as to which 
shop the truck should be taken to have the truck repaired. 
Drivers are clearly informed not to attempt to make repairs 
themselves on the truck. The claimant made no call to the em-
ployer regarding the broken air line or the broken governor and 
has offered no explanation regarding his failure to do so. 
DOT requirements provide for a driver to complete a "vehi-
cle inspection report" every day. There is no indication in 
such reports prepared by the claimant of an air leak in connec-
tion with the road speed governor. 
While the road speed governor was out of commission the 
claimant did in fact for extended periods of time exceed the 
maximum speed set by the governor. If the claimant had not 
exceeded the 62 mile per hour governor speed after the governor 
was broken, it would be probative that the claimant did not in-
tentionally alter the governor, whereas the driving at an 
average speed of 66 miles per hour for extended periods of time 
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is probative that the claimant did intentionally alter the road 
speed governor. 
DRIVING AT SPEEDS IN EXCESS OF THE 62 MILE PER 
HOUR MAXIMUM SET BY THE EMPLOYER. 
The finding that the claimant, while the road speed gover-
nor was broken, drove at an average speed of 66 miles per hour 
for extended periods of time is not in dispute. It is conclu-
sive and binding on the Court. 
CLAIMANT OPERATED HIS VEHICLE FOR NEARLY 22 
HOURS OUT OF A 24 HOUR PERIOD IN VIOLATION OF 
U. S. DOT REGULATIONS AND COMPANY POLICY. 
The claimant drove a total of 21 hours and 28 minutes in 
a 24 hour period. This action was grossly in violation of U. S. 
Department of Transporation regulations and the employer's poli-
cy. The claimant at the hearing did not specifically deny said 
conduct. 
A URINALYSIS TEST DISCLOSED THAT CLAIMANT DURING 
THE TIME OF HIS EMPLOYMENT USED A CONTROLLED 
SUBSTANCE (MARIJUANA). 
When the employer discovered the incident of driving some 
21 1/2 hours within a 24 hours period, he requested that the 
claimant submit to a urinalysis for a drug screen. The test 
showed the presence of traces of marijuana in the claimant's 
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body. The claimant admitted having used marijuana at some time 
in the past. The Board of Review concluded that the claimant 
had used a controlled substance (marijuana) some time prior to 
the urinalysis test administered on December 24, 1985. 
THE DISCHARGE WAS BASED UPON THE CUMULATIVE EF-
FECT OF ALL OF THE AFOREMENTIONED FACTORS AND 
NOT JUST ON THE USE OF MARIJUANA. 
The Board of Review concluded from the evidence that the 
claimant was discharged for a cumulation of factors and in the 
words of the employer's witness "it was a cumulative situation, 
the marijuana was probably the straw that broke the camel's 
back." 
It is submitted that all the above-mentioned findings of 
fact in POINT III are supported by substantial competent evi-
dence and are therefore conclusive and binding on the Court. 
Further, that the conclusion of law of the Board of Review that 
the claimant was disqualified from receiving benefits under 
§5(b)(1) of the Act falls within the limits of reasonableness 
and rationality and should therefore be affirmed. 
POINT IV 
ANALYSIS OF UTAH SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 
In the recent decision of Lane v. Board of Review filed 
October 16, 1986 the Court reversed the Board of Review and 
-9-
allowed benefits under § 5 ( b ) ( l ) . The facts in the instant case 
are clearly distinguishable from the Lane case. In the Lane 
case the Court held that Lane's conduct in selling beer to a 
minor after having failed to check the age of the individual 
in question fell into the category of an isolated error in 
judgment or discretion and did not satisfy the culpability 
factor. The offenses of the claimant in the instant case do 
satisfy the culpability factor and do not fall into the cate-
gory of an isolated error in judgment or discretion. 
In the case of Logan Regional Hospital v. Board of Re-
view the Court affirmed the Board of Review decision holding 
that where the element of fault is lacking a disqualification 
from benefits is not warranted. The Court agreed with the 
conclusion of the Board of Review that circumstances which 
led to the claimant's discharge were the result of inadvertent 
conditions beyond the control of the claimant. It is submitted 
that in the instant case the control factor is clearly satis-
fied. 
In the case of Terminal Service Company v. Board of Review 
the Court affirmed the decision of the Board of Review which 
allowed benefits. The decision was based mainly upon the 
knowledge factor. The Court found that the claimant was not 
clearly warned that future attendance deficiencies would re-
sult in termination. The facts of the instant case are clearly 
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distinguishable. The claimant does not contend that he under-
stood it was okay to alter the road speed governor nor does he 
contend he understood it was okay to drive at the excessive 
speed indicated nor that he was unaware of the company policy 
and DOT regulations prohibiting his action in driving some 
21 1/2 hours out of a 24 hour period. 
In the case of Spartan AMC/Jeep v. Board of Review, the 
Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Board of Review 
allowing benefits under §5( b ) ( l ) . This case mainly involved 
a dispute as to the facts. The Board believed the claimant's 
explanation and the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there 
was substantial competent evidence to support the findings of 
fact of the Board. In the instant case the facts are generally 
not disputed except as regards whether or not the claimant in-
tentionally altered the road speed governor. With respect to 
this finding of fact, it is submitted there is substantial 
competent evidence supporting the finding of the Board of 
Revi ew. 
In the case of Wright's Furniture Mill, Inc. v. Industrial 
Commission, the Court affirmed the decision of the Board of 
Review allowing benefits under § 5 ( b ) ( l ) . The culpability factor 
was involved in this case. In Wright 1s a truck driver had in-
curred two speeding violations in Texas some 18 months prior to 
his discharge. The instant case is clearly distinguishable 
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involving infractions incurred immediately prior to the dis-
charge which clearly satisfied the culpability requirement. 
In the case of Kehl v. Board of Review the Court consid-
ered the "just cause" provisions of the Statute for the first 
time and affirmed the decision of the Board of Review denying 
benefits under the just cause provision of § 5 ( b ) ( l ) . In Kehl 
the Court analyzed the facts in accordance with the culpability, 
knowledge and control tests set forth in Department Proposed 
Regulations. The Court concluded that all three tests had been 
satisfied and that the denial of benefits on the basis the 
claimant was discharged for "just cause" was justified. It is 
submitted the claimant in the instant case was also properly 
denied benefits on the basis of a review of the facts under the 
culpability, knowledge and control factors. 
CULPABILITY 
The four offenses involved were each serious offenses. 
The discharge was consistent with reasonable employment prac-
tices. The conduct of the claimant in the instant case cannot 
be characterized as an isolated instance of poor judgment or a 
single violation of relatively insignificant import. 
-12-
KNOWLEDGE 
There is no indication in the record in this case that the 
employer's expectations were unclear, ambiguous or inconsistent 
except possibly with respect to the use of marijuana off of the 
job. As respects the use of marijuana the claimant concedes 
that he was aware that use of marijuana while performing his 
duties as a truck driver was contrary to the employer's policy 
and contrary to U. S. Department of Transportation rules and 
regulations. By reason of the very nature of the job involving 
driving on the road away from the terminal for weeks at a time 
the employer could not monitor the claimant's physical condi-
tion. The claimant reasonably should have known that any dis-
covery of a controlled substance in his system under the cir-
cumstances of his particular job would have a serious affect 
upon his job and a \/ery high degree of likelihood of a dis-
charge. 
CONTROL 
The employer 's p o l i c y requ i red a d r i v e r to immediately 
contact the shop of the employer in Paye t te , Idaho to repo r t 
any mechanical f a i l u r e . Dr ivers were p r o h i b i t e d from doing 
t h e i r own repa i r s whi le out on the road . I t c e r t a i n l y was 
w i t h i n the c l a i m a n t ' s con t ro l to repor t the mechanical f a i l u r e 
- 1 3 -
involving the road speed governor to the employer rather than 
attempting repairs on it himself. As respects exceeding the 
speed limit and driving some 21 1/2 hours in a 24 hour period 
it certainly was within the control of the claimant to drive 
within the set speed limits and not exceed allowed driving time, 
and to notify the employer if there was a problem delivery time 
and request the employer to have it rescheduled. As respects 
the use of marijuana or other controlled substances it must be 
assumed it was within the control of the claimant to obey the 
law and refrain from using such substances. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
IN REVIEWING A DETERMINATION OF THE INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION UNDER THE UTAH EMPLOYMENT SECURITY 
ACT, THE COURT WILL AFFIRM THE COMMISSION'S 
FINDINGS OF FACT IF SUCH ARE SUPPORTED BY SUB-
STANTIAL COMPETENT EVIDENCE AND WILL IMPLEMENT 
AN INTERMEDIATE STANDARD OF REVIEW WITH REGARD 
TO MIXED QUESTIONS OF LAW AND FACT. 
The standard of review in unemployment insurance cases is 
well established. § 3 5 - 4 - 1 0 ( i ) , Utah Code Annotated 1953, pro-
vides in pertinent part: 
In any judicial proceeding under this sec-
tion, the findings of the Commission and 
the Board of Review as to the facts if sup-
ported by evidence, shall be conclusive and 
the jurisdiction of the Court shall be con-
fined to questions of law. 
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This Court has consistently held that the Commission's 
findings of fact are conclusive, binding on this Court, and 
to be sustained if supported by competent and substantial evi-
dence in the record. Martinez v. Board of Review, 25 U.2d 131, 
477 P.2d 587 (1970); Whitney v. Board of Review of Industrial 
Commission of Utah, Utah, 585 P.2d 780 (1978). 
This Court has further observed: 
Under §35-4-10(i) the role of this Court is 
to sustain the determinations of the Board 
of Review unless the record clearly and 
persuasively proves the action of the Board 
of Review was arbitrary, capricious and un-
reasonable. Specifically, as a matter of 
law, the determination was wrong; because 
only the opposite conclusion could be drawn 
from the facts. 
Continental Oil Company v. Board of Review of the Industrial 
Commission of Utah, Utah, 568 P.2d 727 (1977). Even in the case 
of conflicting testimony by the parties, this Court has stated: 
. . . Substantial evidence need not be un-
contoverted evidence. It is for the admin-
istrative agency, not this Court, to choose 
between conflicting facts. 
The Court further pointed out that it is beyond the Court's pre-
rogative to determine that the Board's reliance on one party's 
testimony over another's was inappropriate. Salt Lake City 
Corporation v. Department of Employment Security, Utah, 657 P.2d 
1312 (1982). The Court will affirm commission findings on ques-
tions of basic fact if they are supported by evidence of any 
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substance whatever and will set them aside only if they are 
without foundation in fact. Utah Department of Administrative 
Services v. Public Service Commission, Utah, 658 P.2d 601, 
609 (1983). 
Practical experience with judicial review has unquestion-
ably identified a major category of administrative decisions 
on which reviewing courts exercise a scope of review more ex-
tensive than when reviewing agency findings on questions of 
basic fact, but less extensive than when reviewing to correct 
error in agency decisions on questions of general law. Utah 
Department of Administrative Services v. Public Service Commis-
sion, supra, p. 610; Salt Lake City Corporation v. Department 
of Employment Security, supra. This intermediate standard of 
review may be characterized as mixed questions of law and fact 
or the application of findings of fact to the legal rules gov-
erning the case. "In reviewing decisions such as these, a 
court should afford great deference to the technical expertise 
or more extensive experience of the responsible agency." Utah 
Department of Administrative Services v. Public Service Commis-
sion, supra. "The degree of deference extended to the deci-
sions of the commission on these intermediate types of issues 
. . . must fall within the limits of reasonableness or ration-
ality." Utah Department of Administrative Services v. Pub!ic 
Service Commission, supra. The test of rationality may be no 
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more than a matter of logic or completeness, such as when the 
question is whether the commission's findings of fact support 
its conclusion. Utah Department of Administrative Services v. 
Public Service Commission, supra; City of Orem v. Christensen, 
Utah, 682 P.2d 292 (1984). 
In reviewing the commission's interpretations of general 
questions of law, the Court applies a correction-of-error stan-
dard with no deference to the expertise of the commission. 
General questions of law include interpretation of the United 
States Constitution and the acts of Congress and interpretation 
of the Utah Constitution and acts of the Utah Legislature. 
Examples of this correction-of-error type of review include 
whether the commission has acted beyond its statutory jurisdic-
tion or authority and, questions of general law such as the 
interpretation of contracts. Utah Department of Administra-
tive Services v. Public Service Commission, supra, p. 608. 
POINT II 
WHEN A DECISION OF AN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE 
IS APPEALED TO THE BOARD OF REVIEW AND THE BOARD 
OF REVIEW ISSUES A DECISION AFFIRMING, MODIFYING 
OR REVERSING THE ALJ, THE DECISION OF THE ALJ IS 
OF NO FURTHER AFFECT OR VALIDITY EXCEPT TO THE 
EXTENT THE BOARD OF REVIEW IN ITS DECISION 
ADOPTS THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND/OR CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW OF THE DECISION OF THE ALJ. 
On page 7 of his Brief, the claimant asserts that this 
Court should affirm the decision of the ALJ because it is 
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supposedly supported by substantial evidence whereas the Board's 
decision disallowing benefits is supposedly not supported by 
substantial evidence. It is submitted that once a decision of 
the ALJ had been appealed to the Board of Review and the Board 
of Review allows the appeal, either because the ALJ decision 
did not affirm a prior decision, or the Board in its discretion 
elects to hear an appeal on the merits in a situation where an 
ALJ did affirm a prior decision, the decision of the Board of 
Review then supplants and takes the place of the decision of 
the ALJ and becomes the decision of the Commission. At that 
point the decision of the ALJ is void and without any further 
operative effect except to the extent that the Board of Review 
adopts the Findings of Fact and/or Conclusions of Law of the 
decision of the ALJ in its (the Board of Review) decision. The 
relevant provisions of the Utah Employment Security Act in 
this regard are as follows: 
35-4-10(d)(1) The governor shall appoint a 
review board composed of three impartial 
members to hear and decide referrals and 
appeals from the decision of the appeal 
referee. . . . 
(d)(2) The board of review within the time > 
specified for the filing of appeals may al-
low an appeal from a decision of an appeals 
referee on application filed within the 
designated time by any party entitled to 
notice of the decision. An appeal filed by 
the party shall be allowed as of right if 
the decision did not affirm a prior deci-
sion. Upon appeal the board of review may 
-18-
on the basis of the evidence previously 
submitted in the case, or upon the basis of 
any additional evidence it requires, af-
firm, modify or reverse the findings, con-
clusions and decision of the appeal refer-
ee. The board of review shall promptly 
notify the parties to any proceedings be-
fore it of its decision, including its 
findings and conclusions, and thejdecision 
shall be final unless within ten days after 
mailing of notice to the parties 1 last 
known addresses or in the absenceiof mail-
ing within ten days after the delivery of 
the notification further appeal i$ initi-
ated under the provisions of this!sect ion; 
provided that upon denial by the board of 
review of an application for appeal from 
the decision of an appeal referee the deci-
sion of the appeal referee shall f)e deemed 
to be a decision of the board >^f review 
within the meaning of this paragraph for 
purposes of judicial review andi shall be 
subject to judicial review witnin the 
time and in the manner herein provlided, 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended. 
It is clear from the foregoing quoted provisions of the 
Act that the Board of Review is appointed by the Governor to 
decide referrals and appeals from decisions of the Administra-
Law Judges. When an appeal has been allowed by the Board it 
is the responsibility of the Board to make a decision on the 
merits based upon the record before it. It is a de novo review 
in the sense that the Board makes its owh findings of fact 
based upon all of the evidence in the recorjd. The role of the 
Board of Review in reviewing appealed ALJ jdecisions is quite 
different from the role of the Supreme Court when a decision 
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of a Board of Review has been appealed to the Court under §35-4-
10(i) of the Act. When a decision of the Board of Review is 
appealed to the Supreme Court "the findings of the Commission 
and the Board of Review as to the facts if supported by evi-
dence, shall be conclusive and the jurisdiction of the Court 
shall be confined to questions of law." 
Inasmuch as the Board of Review has issued its decision 
in this case the decision of the ALJ is of no further effect 
and is void. The Board of Review did not adopt any of the 
findings of fact and conclusions of law of the decision of 
the Administrative Law Judge in its decision. The claimant 
on page 7 of its Brief refers to the holding in Kehl v. Board 
of Review, Utah, 700 P.2d 1129 (1985) that "because of the 
technical experience of the ALJ and the ALJ's ability to more 
closely evaluate the testimony proffered, great deference should 
be afforded to the ALJ's decision." This does not mean that 
the Court should prefer the decision of the ALJ over the dec -
ision of the Board of Review. The decision of the Board of 
Review supplants the decision of the ALJ as mentioned above and 
the Supreme Court affords great deference to the technical 
expertise or more extensive experience of the final statement 
or decision of the Agency, which under the statutory scheme of 
the Employment Security Act is rendered by the Board of Review 
consisting of a Member of the Industrial Commission and two 
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Members appointed for two year terms by the governor. §35-4-
10(d)(1), Utah Employment Security Act. 
POINT III 
THE BOARD OF REVIEW'S DECISION THAT APPELLANT 
CLAIMANT WAS DISQUALIFIED FROM RECEIVING BENE-
FITS UNDER §35-4-5(b)(l) OF THE ACT FALLS WITHIN 
THE LIMITS OF REASONABLENESS AND RATIONALTITY 
AND THE COURT SHOULD THEREFORE AFFORD GREAT DE-
FERENCE TO THE BOARD'S TECHNICAL EXPERTISE AND/ 
OR EXTENSIVE EXPERIENCE IN SUCH MATTERS. 
The Board of Review found that the claimant was discharged 
from his employment for four reasons. First, "That the truck's 
road speed governor had been altered to allow driving in excess 
of the 62 mile per hour maximum speed the governor would have 
allowed." Second, "that the on-board computer showed that the 
truck had averaged about 66 miles per hour." Third, "that the 
claimant had operated his vehicle for nearly 22 hours out of a 
24 hour period, which is clearly a violation of both the United 
States Department of Transportation Hours of Service regulations 
and company policy." Fourth, "On a urinalysis test for drug 
usage, he was found to have used a controlled substance (mari-
j u a n a ) . " R.0019 Each of said findings of fact is amply sup-
ported by the evidence in the record. 
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CLAIMANT ALTERED THE TRUCK'S ROAD SPEED GOVERNOR 
The testimony on this point is in dispute but the Board's 
decision is amply supported by substantial and competent evi-
dence. The employer's Safety Manager, Nixon, testified: 
I was notified by the mechanics in the shop 
that one of the drivers had come in and 
mentioned something about an air leak that 
he had tried to fix himself. They told me 
that the air leak involved a road speed 
governor, which is within my department to 
investigate any problems with that area. 
R.0039 
The employer's witness Nixon testified that the employer checked 
out the governor and found it was not working. The governor, 
when it is working, restricts the RPM so as not to allow the 
truck to go in excess of approximately 61 or 62 miles per hour. 
Upon examination of the mechanism, the employer's shop found 
that a valve on top of the transmission had been removed or some 
way tampered with. The valve itself was cracked and broken. 
The brass fittings going to the valve had been removed by some-
thing other than a proper sized wrench because there were teeth 
marks in the brass and the corners were rounded off. One of 
the air lines had an extreme amount of tape on it which is not 
the type of repair a proper shop would perform. R.0039,0040 
Nixon confronted the claimant with the evidence discovered and 
the claimant responded to Nixon: 
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He indicated to me that he had oroken an 
air line while he was out on the road and 
that he felt it was necessary to repair it. 
And he did indicate that he did remove the 
valve in order to make that repair, and 
that in the process of doing so, apparent-
ly, that is how it became cracked and bro-
ken. He also indicated that he Itaped it 
trying to get the air leak to stop. R.0040 
The employer has a clear cut, well known policy that explains 
what drivers are to do when they have a breakdown or a mechanic 
is needed on the road. The policy is: 
At any time there's a mechanical failure or 
break down on the road, they are to notify 
the head of maintenance in the shop in Pay-
ette, Idaho. At that point, he wijl direct 
them to a shop to have that--the problem 
repaired. We are pretty specific about 
drivers not doing their own repairs on the 
road. R.0040 
The driver has alternate phone numbers for a driver to call 
before and after shop hours so that anytime of day or night 
they can reach supervisory personnel. R.^040 The employer 
testified that the claimant made no call regarding the broken 
air line or with regard to a broken governor. R.0040 The 
employer testified that the claimant did not offer any reason-
able explanation as to why he did not call in to report the 
mechanical failure. 
. . . He was aware of the fact that that's 
something that he should of done. He ex-
pressed the idea, that he was out, as he 
said, '50 miles from the nearest town. 1 My 
comment was, you know, 'why didn't 
and report it then, and we could h| 
you stop 
ave had a 
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proper repair made at that time, 1 and we 
had that discussion about it, Mr. Grinnell 
really couldn't offer an explanation as to 
why he didn't do it. R.0042 
The employer asked the claimant when he had first observed 
the leak. The claimant responded that he had been writing it 
up for quite some time. DOT requirements provide that eyery 
day a driver complete what is called a "vehicle inspection re-
port." The employer maintains a file of these reports. Nixon 
testified: "I went back through all of his vehicle inspection 
reports and the only thing that I can find that indicates an 
air leak, was written up on September 20th of 1985." R.0043 
This was some three months before the incident which gave rise 
to the termination on or about December 20, 1985. The air 
leak referred to in the September 20th report was around the 
battery box, something different from the air leak in question 
regarding the speed governor. R.0043 
The on-board computer installed in claimant's truck dis-
closed that beginning on the 17th day of December of 1985 there 
were three extended periods of time when the claimant averaged 
66 miles per hour for extended periods of time. R.0041 This 
was at the same time that the speed governor was broken. Other-
wise the governor would have prevented his driving at such 
excessive speeds. The employer's Safety Manager, Nixon, con-
cluded that the claimant had tampered with the speed governor 
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because of the combination of the mechanical defect that was 
present (the broken governor) and also the increased speed 
at that same time. The fact that the governor was broken did 
not cause the claimant to drive above the 62 mile per hour 
speed which the claimant certainly knew was required by the 
employer simply by the fact of the installation of governors on 
the trucks limiting the top speed to 62 miles per hour. 
Nixon: Well in looking at the evidence, my 
conclusion was that, that there was 
some possible tampering involved 
there, because of the combination 
of the mechanical defect that was 
present and also the increased 
speed at that particular time. 
R.0041 
The fact that the claimant did drive at excessive speed at that 
time it is submitted does tend to prove that the claimant in-
tentionally tampered with the speed governor and that it was 
not just a matter of the claimant taping an air line which 
broke in order to avoid loss of air pressure resulting in his 
brakes jamming up on him while driving. R.00 71 
Upon discovering the air leak and upon discovering that 
the speed governor was not operating, the claimant in accord-
ance with clearly stated company policy should have called in 
at the first opportunity to report the mechanical failure and 
receive instructions as to how to handle the problem and how 
to effect repairs through a proper repair shop. The employer 
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had clearly informed all drivers, including the claimant, that 
they were not to do their own repairs on the truck while out 
on the road. R.0040 The claimant does not admit altering the 
speed governor, but rather vigorously contends that he perform-
ed necessary repairs to a broken air line to enable him to get 
back to the terminal. However, it is submitted that there is 
ample evidence in the record to sustain the Board's finding 
that the claimant altered the truck's road speed governor in 
order to allow the claimant to exceed the 62 mile per hour 
maximum speed and that thereafter the claimant did in fact 
exceed the maximum speed and averaged 66 miles per hour for 
extended periods of time. 
DRIVING AT SPEEDS IN EXCESS OF THE 62 MILE PER 
HOUR MAXIMUM SET BY THE EMPLOYER. 
The employer testified that it has a Rockwell Trip Master 
Computer installed on each of its trucks. There was one in-
stalled on the claimant's truck during the time period in ques-
tion and it was functioning properly at the time. The employ-
er's Safety Manager, Nixon, examined the data from the on-board 
computer to see if the claimant had been exceeding the maximum 
speed during the time when the speed governor was broken. Nixon 
testified: 
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. . . Beginning on the - let me rina tne 
date here. Beginning on the 17th of Decem-
ber, I found that for a period of time, 
beginning about 6 o'clock in the evening 
and going until almost 2 o'clock in the 
morning of the next day, there were three 
different periods of time where Mr. Grin-
nell averaged 66 miles per hour for extend-
ed periods of time. R.0041 
This writer has been unable to find any evidence in the record 
disputing the testimony of the employer regarding the claimant's 
driving at an average speed of 66 miles per hour for extended 
periods of time. This finding of the Board of Review is not 
in dispute, is conclusive and binding on the Court. Martinez 
v. Board of Review, supra. 
CLAIMANT OPERATED HIS VEHICLE FOR NEARLY 22 
HOURS OUT OF A 24 HOUR PERIOD IN VIOLATION OF 
U. S. DOT REGULATIONS AND COMPANY P O L I C E 
U. S. Department of Transportation regulations allow a 
driver to drive up to 10 hours and then they require an 8 hour 
break, to wit: 
49 CFR, Chapter 3, §395.3. Maximum Driving 
and on Duty Time. 
(a) Except as provided in paragraph (c) 
and (d) of this section and in §395.10, no 
motor carrier shall permit or require any 
driver used by it to drive nor shall any 
such driver drive: 
(1) More than 10 hours following 8 conse-
cutive hours off duty; or 
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(2) For any period after having been on 
duty 15 hours following 8 consecutive hours 
off duty. 
(3) (Not pertinent in this instance.) 
The employer's Safety Manager, Nixon, testified: 
. . . In reviewing Mr. Grinnell's daily 
trip reports, I found that earlier in his 
trip, in November, he had an extended per-
iod of driving time. DOT regulations will 
allow a driver to have up to ten hours 1 
driving time, then they require an eight 
hour break. Mr. Grinnell drove continuous-
ly, well let me read to you what the re-
sults, or what the printout says, "On the 
21st of November, he began driving at 7:26 
a.m., he drove for a total of 7 hours and 
56 minutes, he stopped the truck at 3:22 
p.m., he covered a distance of 414 miles, 
the truck was stopped for 57 minutes. At 
4:19 p.m., he started up again, drove for 
another 3 hours and 40 minutes. The truck 
was shut off at 7:59 after he had driven 
176 miles, and then he stopped for an hour 
and one minute, and then at 9:00 in the 
evening, he started again and drove for 9 
hours and 52 minutes, shutting the truck 
off the next morning at 6 hours - or, ex-
cuse me, 6:00, 6:00 a.m. and 52 minutes, 
after driving 496 miles. His total road 
hours or driving time was 21 hours and 28 
minutes. . . . R.0044 
The claimant had driven for 21 hours and 28 minutes and during 
that time had only had one hour and 58 minutes break. It is 
clear that the claimant was grossly in violation of the above-
quoted DOT regulations. 
Claimant was also in violation of the employer's policy 
and rules in this regard. In response to the question as to 
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whether the employer has a policy in this regard, Nixon testi 
f ied: 
Nixon: Yes, in fact it is \/ery clear that, 
the DOT regulations will be com-
plied with and that if necessary, 
we will reschedule the load. 
Wilson: Suppose a driver was assigned a 
load with a delivery time that can-
not be legally complied with. What 
is a driver expected to do? 
Nixon: At that point the driver should 
talk to the dispatcher and see if 
he will reschedule it. If the dis-
patcher refuses to reschedule it, 
then we expect the drivers to get 
in touch with the Safety Depart-
ment, at which time we will get the 
load rescheduled, rather than have 
the driver violate the regulations. 
Wilson: How are the 
policy? 
drivers advised of that 
Nixon: They're advised of it basically I 
guess you could say three ways: 
one way they're told in orienta-
tion, another way, it's, it's in 
our written policies, and the third 
way, if the driver has a log book 
violation, he is mailed a warning 
letter which indicates yery speci-
fically on there, what our policies 
are. R.0045 
The claimant does not dispute this allegation of the em-
ployer. The claimant generally states in his appeal to the ALJ 
Also I am accused of violations of exceed-
ing maximum driving and on duty time. I 
have in my possession all the log books 
from the time I started working at May 
Trucking and there are no violations. 
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The claimant at the hearing did not specifically deny that he 
drove 21 hours and 28 minutes in a 24 hour period. 
It is submitted that this finding of the Board of Review 
is supported by substantial competent evidence, is conclusive 
and binding on the Court. 
A URINALYSIS TEST DISCLOSED THAT CLAIMANT DURING 
THE TIME OF HIS EMPLOYMENT USED A CONTROLLED 
SUBSTANCE (MARIJUANA). 
The Board of Review in its decision acknowledged that: 
There may well be insufficient evidence re-
specting the claimant's use of marijuana to 
demonstrate when the claimant had actually 
used the drug or what effect, if any, the 
use of the drug had upon his driving abil-
ity. R.0019 
The claimant returned from an approximately two week road trip 
with his truck on December 20, 1986. When the employer dis-
covered the incident of driving 21 hours plus within 24 hours, 
it was concerned that the claimant may have used a controlled 
drug of some sort to enable him to accomplish such a feat. At 
that point the employer requested that the claimant submit to a 
urinalysis for a drug screen. The claimant agreed and submit-
ted to the test. The result of the test showed the presence of 
traces of marijuana in the claimant's body. R.0046 When the 
results came back positive the employer asked the laboratory to 
recheck the same specimen and the laboratory came up with the 
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same results. The claimant admitted having used marijuana at 
some time in the past but denied being a habitual user or an 
adict. The claimant denied smoking any marijuana while in 
control of any motor vehicle. R.0050 The employer contends 
that the urinalysis test and the testimony of the claimant 
prove that the claimant used marijuana sometime during the two 
week period of time that he was on the road with his truck on 
his last trip from which he returned on December 20, 1985. The 
claimant denies this, but does not specifically state when he 
used marijuana which gave rise to the positive result in the 
test administered on December 24. It is submitted that the 
finding of fact of the Board of Review that the claimant had 
used a controlled substance (marijuana) sometime prior to the 
urinalysis test administered on December 24, 1985 is supported 
by substantial competent evidence and is, therefore, binding 
on the Court. 
THE DISCHARGE WAS BASED UPON THE CUMULATIVE 
EFFECT OF ALL OF THE AFOREMENTIONED FACTORS AND 
NOT JUST UPON THE USE OF MARIJUANA. 
The Board of Review found that the employer's decision to 
discharge the claimant was based upon a cumulation of factors, 
i.e., tampering with the road speed governor, exceeding the 
maximum speed set by the employer, grossly exceeding the allow-
ed driving time in a 24 hour period, and use of marijuana. This 
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finding is amply supported by the evidence. The ALJ carefully 
questioned the employer's witness, Nixon, on this issue 
Judge: Just, just one point Mr. Nixon, are 
you saying then that all these 
other problems, the problem with 
the governor, the log — driving too 
long and so forth, brought up a 
suspension, but the actual termina-
t i o n — d e c i s i o n to make the termina-
tion, came when you determined that 
Mr. Grinnell had marijuana in his 
system, following the drug test? 
R.0048 
Nixon : Wei 1 , what I 
bination of 
m saying is the com-
all of those things. 
Had it not been for the, the po s i -
tive results on the drug test, 
Mr. Grinnell probably would have 
had a two-week suspension and then 
it would have been over with. (Em-
phasis added.) 
Judge: Would any of these others had made 
any difference if you'd determined 
he had marijuana in his system? 
Nixon: The tampering situation is an of-
fence for which drivers are termin-
ated . 
Judge: Okay, but you say that would have 
probably only resulted in a suspen-
sion. My question is, if you would 
of determined that he had marijuana 
in his system, without any of these 
other problems, would he have been 
terminated for having the marijuana 
in his system? 
Nixon: Yes sir. 
Judge: That — so none of the rest of them 
really make a damn bit of differ-
ence, it's the marijuana in the 
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system that matters? Excuse my 
language, excuse my language, but 
I want to get to the point. I've 
heard an awful lot of talking here 
and about two minutes of the reason 
for the discharge. 
Nixon: All those things, all 
enter in We 
t h o s e t h i n g s 
very clear to make it 
our employees that, that any tam-
pering with the equipment or any 
drug usage is not tolerated, and 
that they will be terminated. (Em-
phasis added.) 
Judge 
Nixon 
Judge 
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charge 
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irig m a r i -
umed m a r -
ing to go 
on of use 
ely a s e -
t m y c o n -
eterrnined 
j u a n a , it 
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of t h o s e 
I mean they may have 
t i v e , bu t when t h e 
d e t e r m i n e d , t h a t was 
t e r m i n a t i o n ? 
been accumula-
m a r i j u a n a was 
t he reason f o r 
N i x o n : I , I agree w i t h what you j u s t s a i d . 
I t was a a c c u m u l a t i v e s i t u a t i o n , 
.f t he m a r i j u a n a was p r o b a b l y t h e l a s t 
s t r a w t h a t b roke t he c a m e l ' s b a c k . 
Judge: But without any of the others, if 
he would have taken a drug test, 
determined that he had marijuana in 
his system, he would have been dis-
charged, correct? 
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Nixon: That is cor rec t? R.0049 
The employer 's Terminal Manager, B e r r e t t , t e s t i f i e d : 
Mike the reason you were not te rminated be-
cause of the tampering which we found, im-
media te ly at t h a t p o i n t , was because you 
have been a good d r i v e r , and we wanted to 
give you, give you every9 every chance we 
poss ib ly c o u l d . And t h a t f s the reason you 
weren ' t immedia te ly , immediate ly terminated 
at t h a t p o i n t . Had t h a t happened to some-
one who had an accident t o o , they would 
have been out the door at t h a t p o i n t , Mike. 
And so i t r e a l l y , how you were able to do 
t h a t , I , I don ' t know, I d o n ' t have the 
s l i g h t e s t idea how, how t h a t was. I t ' s 
possib le maybe you a r e n ' t a f requent user , 
I don ' t know, but the chance t h a t you would 
be , i s not something we want--we are going 
to t a k e . R.0058 
I t is submitted t h a t the Board of Review c o r r e c t l y con-
cluded from the evidence t h a t the c la imant was discharged for a 
cumulat ion of f a c t o r s and in the words of the employer 's w i t -
ness , Nixon, " I t was a accumulat ive s i t u a t i o n , the mar i juana 
was probably the straw t h a t broke the camel 's back". R.0049 
POINT IV 
THE DECISION OF THE BOARD OF REVIEW IS IN ACCORD 
WITH THE DECISIONS OF THIS COURT INTERPRETING 
THE "JUST CAUSE" FOR DISCHARGE PROVISION OF §35-
4-5(b)(l) OF THE ACT AND DEPARTMENT RULES INTER-
PRETING SAID SECTION. 
ANALYSIS OF UTAH SUPREME COURT DECISIONS. 
The most recent decision of this Court regarding "just 
cause" and §5(b) (1) of the Act is the case of Lane v. Board 
-34-
of Review, Case No. 20888, filed October 16, 1986. The Lane 
case notes the fact that the Proposed Rule of the Department 
upon which the Court relied in Kehl v. Board of Review of Indus-
trial Commission, supra, was finally adopted as of January 15, 
1986. The Court further noted that said adopted Department of 
Employment Security Unemployment Insurance Rules pertaining to 
§5(b)(1) of the Act can properly serve as the basis of decision 
of any matter decided after January 15, 1986. Inasmuch as the 
decision of the Board of Review in the instant case was dated 
April 29, 1986 and mailed May 1, 1986, Unemployment Insurance 
Rule B. pertaining to §35-4-5(b)(1) of the Act defining "just 
cause" was properly taken into consideration and served as the 
basis of the decision of the Board of Review. 
The Court in its decision in the Lane case considered the 
culpability factor set forth in Clearfield City v. Department 
of Employment Security, Utah, 663 P.2d 440, 441 (1983) in re-
versing the Board of Review and holding that Lane's discharge 
was not for "just cause." The Court held that the claimant 
Lane's conduct fell into the category of an isolated error in 
judgment or discretion. The claimant was discharged for sell-
ing beer to a minor after having failed to check the age of the 
individual in question. The Court held that claimant's failure 
to check the age of the person to whom he sold the beer was a 
mistake in judgement and not an intentional or knowing disre-
gard of the employer's policy. The Court found that the 
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employer had not established any clear procedure for employees 
to follow to assure that beer would not be sold to minors other 
than to instruct their employees to "check identification when 
age was in doubt." The Court held that when the employer in 
Lane left certain matters to the employee's discretion with only 
vague guidelines that the employer cannot expect its employee 
to be denied unemployment compensation if it discharges such 
an employee. 
The facts in the instant case are clearly distinguishable 
from the Lane case. Claimant's offenses in the instant case 
do not fall into the category of an isolated error in judgment 
or discretion. (See discussion of the CULPABILITY factor here-
after on page 43.) The offenses of the claimant in the instant 
case of altering the road speed governor and driving at speeds 
averaging 66 miles per hour and grossly exceeding DOT regula-
tions and employer policy limiting the hours a driver may oper-
ate a vehicle following eight consecutive hours off duty, were 
clearly distinguishable from Lane's mistake in judgment in 
failing to ask for I.D. to determine the age of the individual 
to whom he sold beer, who turned out to be a minor. The Court 
in the Lane case stressed the fact that the employer had not 
established any clear procedures for employees to follow to 
assure that beer would not be sold to minors. The Court went 
so far as to cite an example of a procedure that could have 
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been established by the employer to require the checking of 
identification of all people who looked younger than forty. 
The Court then noted that if the employee Lane had violated 
such a specific procedure with respect to which he had been 
trained, a finding of just cause might be sustainable. 
In the instant case we have no such similar inadvertent 
mistake of judgement on the part of an employee due to a fail-
ure of the employer to to establish clear procedures and policy. 
As previously mentioned in POINT III the expectations and pol-
icy of the employer with regard to altering the speed governor 
and the driver making repairs on the truck on the road without 
first calling in to enable the employer to arrange to have the 
repairs performed by a qualified mechanic ip a proper shop had 
j 
been made known to the claimant and he was well aware of the 
policy. As respects driving at an average speed of 66 miles 
per hour for extended periods of time and driving some 21 and 
one-half hours in a 24 hours period, the policy of the employer 
and the requirements of DOT regulations were well known, clear 
and unambiguous and the claimant has not contended otherwise. 
As respects the use of marijuana there is some uncertainty 
as regards whether off-duty use of the marijuana was prohibit-
ed under the employer's policy. However, it is submitted the 
claimant reasonably should have known that a discovery of a 
controlled substance in his system under the circumstances of 
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his particular job would have a very serious affect on his job 
and place his job in serious jeopardy. (See discussion of 
KNOWLEDGE hereinafter on page 45.) 
Claimant refers to the case of Logan Regional Hospital v. 
Board of Review, 39 Utah Adv. Rep. 34 (1986), on page 11 of its 
brief. In the Logan Hospital case the claimant, Dailami, was 
allowed benefits under §35-4-5(b)(1) of the Act. The Logan 
Hospital case is clearly distinguishable from the instant case. 
The Board of Review in Logan Hospital held that the claimant's 
failure to control the water pressure in the building with a 
bypass valve while trying to repair the regular valve, was 
beyond the claimant's control. The Board further concluded 
that the employer failed to show that claimant's performance 
was the result of anything other than inability, incapacity, or 
isolated instances of inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in 
isolated instances. The Supreme Court affirmed the Board of 
Review's decision holding that "where the element of fault is 
lacking, the employee's conduct may be sufficient for discharge, 
but is not necessarily sufficient for a disqualification from 
benefits under the Employment Security Act." 
The Court went on to state: "The administrative law judge 
expressly found that the circumstances leading to Dailami's 
discharge were the result of inadvertent conditions beyond his 
power of control, precluding a discharge for just cause." It 
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is clear that the decision in Logan Hospital to allow benefits 
is based upon a fault concept as set forth in Department rules 
and a finding by the Court in agreement with the finding of 
the Board of Review and the Administrative Law Judge that the 
claimant's failure of performance in the incident which gave 
rise to his discharge was beyond his control and therefore a 
denial of benefits under §35-4-5(b) (1) was not justified. In 
the instant case the control factor is clearly satisfied. The 
Board of Review found that the claimant had altered the truck's 
road speed governor to allow driving in excess of the 62 mile 
per hour maximum speed the governor would have allowed. The 
Board also found that the truck had in fact averaged 66 miles 
per hour during certain substantial periods of time. Third, 
the Board found that the claimant had operated his vehicle for 
nearly 22 hours out of a 24 hours period in violation of U. S. 
Department of Transportation regulations and company policy. 
And fourth, the claimant had used a controlled substance (mari-
juana) as disclosed by a urinalysis test. R.0019 All four of 
the objectionable actions referred to above were clearly with-
in the control of the claimant Grinnell. 
In the case of Terminal Service Company v. Board of Review, 
26 Utah Adv. Rep. 24 (1986), the Court affirmed the decision 
of the Board of Review which allowed benefits under §35-4-5(b) 
( 1 ) . The decision to allow benefits in the Terminal Service 
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Company case was mainly based upon the knowledge factor. The 
Court found that the claimant was not clearly warned that future 
attendance deficiencies would result in termination. The em-
ployer did not present documented evidence regarding the claim-
ant's absences or tardiness. The employer had no written at-
tendance policy and no written warning or reprimand was given 
to the claimant. These facts are clearly distinguishable from 
the instant case. There is no contention on the part of the 
claimant Grinnell that he understood it was all right to alter 
the truck's road speed governor. As mentioned in POINT III 
claimant denies that he altered the speed governor. Grinnell 
does not contend that he did not know he was in violation of 
the employer's rules to drive at an average speed of 66 miles 
per hour. Claimant also does not contend that he was unaware 
of the company policy and Department of Transportation regula-
tions prohibiting his action in driving nearly 22 hours out of 
a 24 hour period. 
In the case of Spartan AMC/Jeep v. Board of Review of the 
Industrial Commission, Utah, 709 P.2d 395 ( 1 9 8 5 ) , the Supreme 
Court affirmed the decision of the Board of Review allowing 
benefits under §35-4-5(b) (1) of the Act. This case mainly 
involved a dispute as to the facts. The employer contended 
that the claimant had taken various property from the employer 
without authorization. Claimant denied having done so. The 
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Board believed the claimant's explanation with regard to the 
various items in question. The Supreme Court affirmed the 
Board of Review stating: 
We view the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the findings and, if there is 
evidence of any substance whatever which 
can be reasonably regarded as supporting 
the determination of the Board of Review, 
we will affirm that determination on ap-
peal . 
In the instant case the claimant does dispute that he altered 
the truck road speed governor but it is submitted there is 
ample evidence in the record to support the finding of the 
Board of Review that the claimant did intentionally alter the 
road speed governor. Claimant does not dispute that he drove 
the truck at an average speed of 66 miles per hour nor that 
he operated the vehicle for 21 plus hours out of a 24 hour 
period, nor that he used marijuana. 
In the case of Wright's Furniture Mill, Inc. v. Industrial 
Commission, Utah, 707 P.2d 113 ( 1 9 8 5 ) , the Court affirmed the 
Board of Review decision allowing benefits under § 3 5 - 4 - 5 ( b ) ( 1 ) . 
In the Wright's case, the claimant Molyneux was discharged 
because the employer's insurance carrier would not insure the 
claimant as a truck driver. The claimant had been cited in 
Texas 18 months prior to his discharge for speeding violations. 
The Administrative Law Judge concluded that although the employ-
er had no reasonable alternative but to either discharge the 
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claimant or offer him other work, that the speeding violations 
which had occurred 18 months previously did not satisfy the 
culpability factor required for disqualification under § 5 ( b ) ( l ) . 
The instant case is clearly distinguishable • The actions of 
Grinnell occurred immediately prior to the discharge and the 
nature of the infractions clearly satisfy the culpability 
requirement as compared to the long forgotten 18 month old 
speeding citation in the Wri ght's case. 
In the case of Rahimi v. Board of Review of Industrial 
Commission, Utah, 706 P.2d 1063 (19 8 5 ) , the Court affirmed the 
decision of the Board denying benefits. In the Rahimi case 
the culpability, knowledge and control factor were each clearly 
satisfied. It is submitted that each of the three factors is 
satisfied in the instant case as will be examined in detail 
hereafter. 
The first case in which this Court construed the "just 
cause" provision of §35-4-5(b)(1) of the Act is the case of 
Kehl v. Board of Review of Industrial Commission, supra. In 
the Kehl case the Court affirmed the decision of the Board of 
Review denying benefits under the "just cause" provision of 
§ 5 ( b ) ( 1 ) . The Court held that the Proposed Department Rules 
and Regulations specifying the culpability, knowledge and con-
trol factors were within the limits of reasonableness and 
rationality and the Court then analyzed the facts in Kehl in 
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ANALYSIS OF THE FACTS AS RESPECTS THE CULPABIL-
ITY, KNOWLEDGE AND CONTROL FACTORS. 
The Unemployment Insurance Rules pertaining to §35-4-5(b) 
(1) of the Act are set out in Appendix C attached hereto. These 
rules set forth the three basic factors which establish just 
cause and are essential for a determination of ineligibility. 
These three factors are culpability, knowledge and control. 
CULPABILITY 
This factor has to do wi 
or the severity of the offens 
employment relationship. The 
to avoid actual or potential 
interests." The Board of Rev 
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th the "seriousness of the conduct 
e as it affects continuance of the 
discharge must have been necessary 
harm to the employer's rightful 
iew in its decision held: 
The employer clearly testified that it was 
the cummulative affect of all the above-
listed factors which resulted in a decision 
to terminate the claimant. The employer 
has noted in its appeal that the number of 
hours which the claimant drove in a 24 hour 
period exceeded double the Federal permis-
sible limit and at speeds substantially in 
excess of the maximim speed limit. More-
over, these violations of company policy, 
as well as state and federal laws, were not 
just isolated incidents that had accumulat-
ed over the period of the claimant's em-
ployment, but rather were an accumulation 
of evidence respecting the claimant's con-
duct on the last trip he drove for the em-
ployer. R.0020 
It is submitted that the decision of the Board of Review meets 
the test of reasonableness and rationality. The discharge it 
is submitted was consistent with reasonable employment prac-
tices. The four offenses involved were each serious offenses. 
The alteration of the truck's road speed governor to allow 
driving in excess of the speed limit set by the governor, then 
actually driving at speeds substantially in excess of the speed 
limit established by the employer, constitute yery serious of-
fenses. The offense of driving 21 hours and 28 minutes in a 
24 hour period was a gross violation of government regulations 
and the employer's policy. The final offense of use of mari-
juana was as stated by the employer representative the "last 
straw that broke the camel's back." The employer's representa-
tive stated that they did not know whether the claimant was a 
frequent user of marijuana or other controlled substances but 
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the evidence of the use of marijuana along with all the other 
offenses caused the employer to make the decision to discharge 
the claimant. The employer didn't want to take the chance 
that the claimant's use of illegal drugs would have a future 
adverse effect upon the employer. R.0058 The conduct of the 
claimant in the instant case cannot be characterized as an 
isolated incident of poor judgment or a single violation of 
relatively insignificant import. The decision of the Board of 
Review that the culpability factor has b^en satisfied is well 
within the limits of reasonableness and rationality and it 
should be affi rmed. 
KNOWLEDGE 
The Rule provides: 
. . . It is not necessary that the claimant 
intended to cause harm to the employer, but 
he should reasonably have been able to 
anticipate the effect his conduct would 
have. . . . 
There is no indication in the record in this case that the 
employer's expectations were unclear, ambiguous or inconsis-
tent. The employer testified that drivers were warned not to 
tamper with the speed governor. R.0049 There is no indica-
tion in the record that the claimant was not well aware of the 
Department of Transportation rules regarding permissible hours 
of driving following eight consecutive hours off duty. 
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The claimant takes the position that he had no warning or 
knowledge that off the job use of marijuana would have any 
affect upon his ability to do his job for the employer. The 
record is not clear that the claimant was warned that he would 
be discharged if it were found that he had used a controlled 
substance while off duty. However, it is the position of the 
Respondents that the marijuna use was not a primary factor 
giving rise to the discharge. Rather the other offenses were 
matters of a nature that they clearly satisfied the knowledge 
factor. They were in the nature of a flagrant violation of a 
universal standard of behavior expected of a truck driver and 
did not require a specific warning although the evidence is to 
the effect that the claimant was given specific warnings regard-
ing said offenses. 
As respects the use of marijuana claimant conceeds that he 
was aware that use of marijuana while performing his duties as 
a truck driver was contrary to the employer's policy and con-
trary to U. S. Department of Transportation rules and regula-
tions. Claimant had been out driving on the road for some 
two weeks away from the employer's terminal in Layton, Utah. 
Claimant reasonably should have known that any positive test 
for use of drugs upon return from his two-week road trip would 
place his job in jeopardy. By reason of the very nature of 
his job the employer could not monitor his physical condition 
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while he was out on the road driving for two weeks at a stretch. 
The claimant reasonably should have known that any discovery 
of a controlled substance in his system under the circumstances 
of his particular job would have a ^ery serious effect upon 
his job and a very high degree of likelihood of a discharge. 
This is so because of the inability of the employer to closely 
supervise and observe the claimant's performance of his duties 
and the need for the employer under the circumstances to be able 
to rely upon its drivers to maintain themselves in a physical 
and mental condition so as to be safe on the road. The employ-
er had a vital interest to avoid liability by reason of negli-
gent or intentional behavior of its drivers resulting in damages 
to third parties. 
CONTROL 
There does not appear to be much dispute that the actions 
complained of were within the control of the claimant. The 
claimant admitted that he tampered with the governor and con-
tends that he did so because it was necessary in order to repair 
an air leak. The tampering with the speed governor, whether to 
repair an air leak or for the purpose of allowing claimant to 
exceed the governor limited speed was clearly a violation of 
the employer's rules and policy. The employer's policy required 
a driver to immediately contact the shop of the employer in 
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Payette, Idaho in case of any mechanical failure. The policy 
prohibited the drivers from doing their own repairs while out 
on the road. It certainly was within the driver's control to 
follow the employer's policy and report the mechanical failure 
to the employer rather than going ahead and working on the 
governor himself without authorization from the employer. 
As respects exceeding the speed limit and driving at an 
average speed of 66 miles an hour, there is no contention by 
the claimant that this did not occur nor that it was in any 
way beyond his control. As respects the violation of DOT regu-
lations and driving 21 plus hours in a 24 hour period, there is 
no indication in the record that claimant was not in fact guilty 
of the infraction. Claimant testified that he was required to 
drive the excessive hours because some dispatcher had set a 
delivery time that caused his actions in order to meet the time 
of delivery. The employer testified that the employer's policy 
in this regard required that drivers comply with the DOT regu-
lations and policy required that a driver contact the employer's 
safety department to have a delivery time rescheduled if a 
delivery time could not be met without violating DOT regula-
tions. It certainly was within the control of the claimant to 
notify the employer of the problem delivery time and request 
the employer to have it rescheduled. Claimant made no such 
attempt to comply with the employer's policy in this regard so 
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as to avoid the gross violation of DOT regulations and the 
employer's policy regarding permissible hours of driving after 
an eight hour rest period. As respects the use of marijuana 
and or other controlled substances, it must be assumed that it 
is within the control of a law abidding citizen to obey the law 
and refrain from using such substances which use is prohibited 
and constitutes a crime. 
CONCLUSION 
The findings of fact of the majority of the Board of Re-
view are supported by substantial competent evidence. The con-
clusion of law of the Board of Review falls within the limits 
of reasonableness or rationality as measured by the statutory 
language, purpose and policy. The Respondent, Department of 
Employment Security, has promulgated Unemployment Insurance 
Rules defining the "just cause" standard as applied in deter-
mining whether a denial of benefits is appropriate in connection 
with a discharge from employment. This Court held in the Kehl 
case that said proposed rules are within the limits of reason-
ableness and rationality. Said rules were adopted in accordance 
with the Utah Rule Making Act as of January 15, 1986. Said 
rules properly serve as the basis of the decision of the Board 
of Review in this case. 
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The three factors essential for a determination of ineli-
gibility per said Unemployment Insurance Rules: culpability, 
knowledge and control, have all been satisfied in the instant 
case. The decision of the majority of the Board of Review deny-
ing benefits to the claimant and relieving the employer of 
charges to its benefit ratio account for tax purposes should be 
affi rmed . 
Respectfully submitted this 24th day of October, 1986. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
WINSTON M. FAUX 
Speci al Assistant 
Attorney General 
B y _ _ 
Winston M. Faux 
Special Assistant 
Attorney General 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I DO HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed four copies of the fore-
going Respondents' Brief, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Ted K. Godfrey, UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC., Attorney for Claim-
ant-Petitioner, Michael F. Grinnell, 385 - 24th Street, Suite 
522, Ogden, Utah 84401, this 24th day of October, 1986. 
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MICHAEL F. GRINNELL : 
S.S.A. No. 384 62 5299 
: Case No. 86-A-563 
vs. : DECISION 
: Case No. 86-BR-106 
DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY : 
After careful consideration of the record and testimony 1n the 
above-entitled matter, the Board of Review hereby reverses the decision of 
the Administrative Law Judge which allowed benefits to the claimant effec-
tive December 29, 1985, pursuant to $35-4-5(b)(l) of the Utah Employment 
Security Act, on the grounds the claimant was discharged from his employ-
ment but not for conduct which 1s disqualifying under the provisions of 
$35-4-5(b)(l) of the Utah Employment Security Act; and held the employer, 
May Trucking Company, l iable for benefit charges In connection with this 
claim. Benefits are denied to the claimant effective December 29, 1985 
and continuing until he has worked In bona fide covered employment and 
earned wages equal to at least six times his weekly benefit amount and Is 
otherwise eligible, on the grounds the claimant was discharged from his 
employment for conduct which 1s disqualifying under the provisions of 
S35-4-5(b)(l) of the Act. This disqualification establishes an overpayment 
1n the amount of $1,351, pursuant to $35-4-6(e) of the Act, which must be 
offset by future benefits to which the claimant may become eligible during 
his current benefit year. The employer, May Trucking Company, Is relieved 
of benefit charges in connection with this claim. 
In reversing the decision of the Administrative Law Judge, the 
Board of Review notes that the claimant was discharged from his employ-
ment after returning from a trip when the employer learned: (1) that the 
truck's road speed governor had been altered to allow driving In excess of 
the 62-m11e per hour maximum speed the governor would have allowed, (2) 
noted that the on-board computer showed the truck had averaged about 66 
miles per hour, (3) that the claimant had operated his vehicle for nearly 
22 hours out of a 24-hour period, which Is clearly a violation of both the 
United States Department of Transportation Hours of Service Regulations and 
company policy; and (4) on a urinalysis test for drug usage he was found 
to have used a controlled substance (marijuana). 
The Board of Review acknowledges that there may well be 1n-
suffient evidence respecting the claimant's use of marijuana to demonstrate 
when the claimant had actually used the drug or what effect, 1f any, the 
use of the drug had upon his driving ability. Nevertheless, the Board of 
Review does not accept the ALJ's conclusion that the claimant's discharge 
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DECISION 
Case No. 86-BR-106 
DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY 
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should be adjudicated solely on the basis of the evidence respecting the 
claimant's use of marijuana. The employer clearly testified that 1t was 
the cumulative effect of all of the above-listed factors which resulted 1n 
a decision to terminate the claimant. The employer has noted In Its appeal 
that the number of hours which the claimant drove In a 24-hour period 
exceeded double the federal permissible limit and at speeds substantially 
In excess of the maximum speed limit. Moreover, these violations of com-
pany policy, as well as state and federal laws, were not just Isolated 
Incidents that had accumulated over the period of the claimant's employ-
ment, but rather were an accumulation of evidence respecting the claimant's 
conduct on the last trip he drove for the employer. The fact that It took 
the employer several days to accumulate and evaluate the evidence cannot 
be used as. a basis for looking only at the strength or weakness of the 
last evidence obtained In making the determination of whether the claimant 
should be disqualified under the provisions of §35-4-5(b)(l) of the Act 
and entirely disregarding the more substantial evidence respecting other 
acts that were part of the same Incident. 
This decision will become final ten days after the date of mail-
ing hereof, and any further appeal must be made directly with the Utah 
Supreme Court at the State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah, within 
ten days after this decision becomes final. To file an appeal with the 
Supreme Court, you must submit to the Clerk of the Court a Petition for 
Writ of Review setting forth the reasons for appeal, pursuant to §35-4-10(1) 
of the Utah Employment Security Act, followed by a Docketing Statement and 
a Legal Brief. 
/S/ Stephen M. Hadley 
/S/ James F. Hannan 
I dissent. 
I don't feel that the urinalysis test for drug usage results were 
that conclusive, particularly where they were taken nearly a week after the 
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claimant's return from the trip. Moreover, I do not find that the claim-
ant's driving 66 miles per hour, which admittedly 1s In violation of the 
law, is that appreciably higher than 62 miles an hour, also 1n violation of 
the law, which the employer basically authorized as evidenced by the fact 
that that's the speed at which the governor was set. 
/S/ Don S. Belka 
iOARD OF REVIEW 
Dated this 29th day of April, 1986. 
Date Mailed: May 1, 1986. 
DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY 
Appeals Tribunal 
Decision of Administrative Law Judge 
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Michael F. Grinnell 
2575 Hwy 89 
Brigham City, Utah 84302 
S.S.A. No. 384 62 5299 
Case No. 86-A-563 
APPEAL FILED: January 29, 1986 
APPEARANCES: Claimant/Employer 
DATE OF HEARING: February 19, 1986 
PLACE OF HEARING: Brigham City, Utah 
The Department's decision dated January 24, 1986 denied unemployment insurance 
benefits effective December 29, 1986 on the grounds the claimant was discharged 
for just cause. Section 35-4-5(b)(l) and 35-4-7(c)(3)(F) of the Utah Employment 
Security Act are quoted on the attached sheet. 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
Prior to filing a claim for unemployment insurance benefits effective December 29, 
1985, the claimant worked as a tractor trailer driver for May Trucking Compare from 
September 20, 1984 to December 19, 1985. His weekly benefit amount is $193.00 for 
26 weeks. 
The claimant was discharged when he was determined to have traces of the drug 
marijuana in his system. After returning from a trip, a mechanic reported to the 
employer the dashboard on the claimant's truck had been removed and an air control 
valve on the governor had been altered. The governor controlled the truck's 
speed to below 62 miles per hour. An on board computor showed the truck had 
averaged about 66 miles per hour. When confronted about the problem, the claimant 
told the safety director he had air brake problems and he had tried to correct 
the difficulties. While the investigation into the air valve was being conducted, 
the safety director discovered the claimant had recorded an excessive driving 
time on his log. He had shown nearly 22 hours of driving time in a 24 hour 
period. The claimant had violated ICC standards by driving without taking proper 
break time. He was put on suspension as a result of the two incidents and the 
safety director ordered him to take a physical examination and a urine analysis 
because there was a serious question as to his ability to drive the extended time 
period without using amphetamines or other such drugs. The urine analysis estab-
lished he had the trace of marijuana in his system. The claimant was discharged 
at that time. 
The employer's policy prohibited the use of drugs or alcohol while employed by the 
company, but there was no written rules available to explain the details of the 
policy. The safety director felt the rule applied to a driver regardless of when 
the drugs were used. The claimant understood the rule was violated if the driver 
APPENDIX B (Page 2) 
consumed the substances while in or around a truck or under the influence of 
the substances while operating the vehicle. He had consumed the drug about two 
to three weeks before the test was administered and he had not used the substance 
regularly. The urine analysis test had been conducted by a local laboratory, but 
there was no information available to explain what influence the amount of drug 
in the claimant's system might have had on the claimant. 
The claimant had a good performance record with the employer and he had not had 
any prior disciplinary problems. Due to his record, the employer had chosen to 
give him a suspension following the incidents involving the governor and the 
ICC violation of excessive driving time rather than discharge him. 
REASONING AND CONCLUSION OF LAW: 
A denial of unemployment insurance benefits following a discharge is based on a 
fault concept, as explained in the following decision: 
When an employee is discharged by his employer, such dis-
charge may have been the result of incompetence, lack of 
skill, or other reasons which are clearly beyond the 
claimant's control. The fact of willful or wanton conduct 
is not established merely by the claimant's knowledge that 
he is violating a reasonable rule of the employer; rather, 
it must be shown from the evidence that the claimant knew 
or had reason to know that his conduct may result in loss 
of employment. (Utah Board of Review, 80-BR-322.) 
In the present case, the evidence clearly established the claimant's discharge 
was the result of the discovery of a drug in his system and the other incidents 
were not the primary reason for the termination. The employer was justified in 
having a policy designed to control and eliminate the problems of drug or alcohol 
used among its truck drivers, but in this instance there is substantial confusion 
as to the understanding of that rule and the application of the rule in the 
claimant's case. The claimant testified credibly that he .had not consumed the 
drug for a considerable amount of time and he was not a regular user of the drug. 
He understood he was not in violation of the rule unless the drug had an influence 
on his driving performance or he had consumed the drug in or around a company 
vehicle. There was insufficient evidence provided to support the employer's 
contention the claimant knew he would be terminated for any use of drugs and the 
employer did not meet its burden of proof in this case to show the claimant had 
knowledge he would lose his job under the circumstances. It is therefore concluded 
the claimant was not discharged for just cause in accordance with the Utah Employ-
ment Security Act. 
It is noted this decision does not attempt to determine the reasonableness of the 
employer's rule. 
The Utah Employment Security Act relieves an employer of charges for unemployment 
insurance benefits when the claimant was discharged for reasons which are disquali-
fying under Section 35-4-5(b) of the Act. The Act does not grant relief when the 
reason for the discharge would not have resulted in a disqualification, even if the 
discharge resulted from circumstances over which the employer had no control. In 
nnnm 
86-A-563 
APPENDIX B (Page 3) 
this case, the claimant was not discharged for disqualifying reasons and the 
employer is, therefore, ineligible for relief of charges. 
DECISION: 
The decision of the Department Representative is reversed and benefits are allowed 
effect ive December 29, 1985 pursuant to Section 35-4-5(b)(1) of the Utah Employ-
ment Security Act provided the claimant was otherwise e l i g i b l e . 
The employer, May Trucking Company, is not relieved of charges as provided by 
Section 35-4-7(c)(3)(F) of the Utah Employment Security Act and is l iable for i t s 
pro-rated share of benefit costs paid to th is claimant. 
Administrative L^r/Odge 
DEPARTMENT OF EhPLOYMENT SECURITY 
This decision w i l l become f inal unless within ten days from February 26, 1986, 
further writ ten appeal i s made to the Board of Review (P. 0. Box 11600, Salt Lake 
Ci ty , Utah 84147) setting for th the grounds upon which the appeal is made. 
ch 
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STATUTES AND RULES APPLICABLE TO THE CASE 
§35-4-5(b)(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended (1985 
Pocket Supplement), provides as follows: 
5. An individual is ineligible for bene-
fits or for purposes of establishing a 
waiting period: 
(b)(1) For the week in which the claimant 
was discharged for just cause or for an act 
or omission in connection with employment, 
not constituting a crime, which is deliber-
ate, willful, or wanton and adverse to the 
employer's rightful interest, if so found 
by the commission, and thereafter until the 
claimant has earned an amount equal to at 
least six times the claimant's weekly bene-
fit amount in bona fide covered employment. 
Rules A., B.I., 2., and 3,, Department of Employment Secu-
rity Unemployment Insurance Rules, pertaining to §35-4-5(b)(1) 
of the Utah Employment Security Act, provides as follows: 
A. GENERAL DEFINITION 
Ordinarily accepted concepts of justice are 
used in determining if a discharge is dis-
qualifying under the "just cause" provi-
sions of the Act. Just cause is defined as 
a job separation that is necessary due to 
the seriousness of actual or potential harm 
to the employer provided the claimant had 
knowledge of the employer's expectations 
and had control over the circumstances 
whigh led to the discharge. Just cause is 
not established if the reason for the dis-
charge is baseless, arbitrary or capricious 
or the employer has failed to uniformly ap-
ply reasonable standards to all employees 
when instituting disciplinary action. The 
purpose of this section is to deny benefits 
to individuals who bring about their own 
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conduct. After the employee is given a 
warning he should be given an opportunity 
to correct objectionable conduct. Addi-
tional violations occurring after the warn-
ing would be necessary to establish just 
cause for a discharge. 
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3. The term "just c a u s e " as used in S e c -
tion 5 ( b ) ( 1 ) d o e s not l e s s e n the r e q u i r e -
ment that t h e r e be some f a u l t on the part 
of the e m p l o y e e i n v o l v e d . P r i o r to the 
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1983 addition of the term "just cause" the 
Commission interpreted Section 5(b)(1) to 
require an intentional infliction of harm 
or intentional disregard of the employer's 
interests. The intent of the Legislature 
in adding the words "just cause" to Section 
5(b)(1) was apparently to correct this re-
strictive interpretation. While some fault 
must be present, it is sufficient that the 
acts were intended, the consequences were 
reasonably foreseeable, and that such acts 
have serious effect on the employee's job 
or the employer's interests. 
§35-4-10(d), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, pro-
vides as follows: 
(d)(1) The governor shall appoint a review 
board composed of three impartial members 
to hear and decide referrals and appeals 
from the decision of the appeal referee. 
(d)(2) The board of review within the time 
specified for the filing of appeals may al-
low an appeal from a decision of an appeals 
referee on application filed within the 
designated time by any party entitled to 
notice of the decision. An appeal filed by 
the party shall be allowed as of right if 
the decision did not affirm a prior deci-
sion. Upon appeal the board of review may 
on the basis of the evidence previously 
submitted in the case, or upon the basis 
of any additional evidence it requires, 
affirm, modify or reverse the findings, 
conclusions and decision of the appeal 
referee. The board of review shall prompt-
ly notify the parties to any proceedings 
before it of its decision, including its 
findings and conclusions, and the decision 
shall be final unless within ten days after 
mailing of notice to the parties' last 
known addresses or in the absence of mail-
ing within ten days after the delivery of 
A P P E N D I X C (Page 6) 
the n 
ated 
provi 
r e v i e 
t h e 
c i s i o 
ed t 
wi thi 
p u r p o 
subje 
and i 
ot i f i 
u n d e r 
ded t 
w of 
de c i s 
n of 
o be 
n th 
ses 
ct to 
n the 
cation 
the pr 
hat upo 
an appl 
ion of 
the appe 
a deci si 
e meani 
of judic 
judici 
manner 
further 
o v i s i o n 
n d e n i a 
i c a t i o n 
an appe 
al refe 
on of t 
ng of 
i al re 
al revi 
herein 
app 
s of 
1 by 
for 
al re 
ree s 
he bo 
this 
vi ew 
ew wi 
provi 
eal i 
this 
the 
appe 
f eree 
hall 
ard o 
parag 
and 
thin 
ded. 
s i n i t i -
sect ion; 
board of 
al from 
the de-
be deem-
f review 
raph for 
shall be 
the time 
§ 3 5 - 4 - 1 0 ( i ) , Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, pro-
vides as follows: 
(i) 
the 
aggri 
by c 
court 
revie 
other 
board 
In t 
be ve 
which 
upon 
upon 
nates 
ice o 
with 
petit 
board 
def en 
revi e 
court 
cr i pt 
toget 
ci sio 
Within 
board o 
eved pa 
ommenci 
agains 
w of i 
party 
of rev 
hat act 
rifi ed 
a rev 
a memb 
t h a t pe 
and se 
n al 1 p 
the par 
ion as 
of rev 
dant. 
w shal 
all do 
of all 
her wi 
n. 
ten days 
f review 
rty may 
ng an ac 
t the b 
t s d e c i s i 
to the 
shal 
a pe 
must 
i s s 
of th 
lew 
ion 
but 
iew 
er 
rson the 
rvice is 
arties bu 
ty served 
there a 
i ew shal 1 
With its 
1 certif 
cuments a 
testimon 
th its fi 
after 
has b 
secure 
t ion 
oard o 
on in 
procee 
1 be m 
tition 
state 
ought 
e boa 
board 
deemed 
t ther 
as ma 
re def 
mai 1 
answe 
y and 
nd pap 
y tak 
n d i n g s 
the d 
ecome 
judi c 
in th 
f rev i 
wh i c h 
di ng 
ade a 
whic 
the gr 
shall 
rd of 
of rev 
compl 
e sha 
ny cop 
endant 
one co 
r, the 
file 
ers an 
en i n 
of fa 
ecision of 
final , any 
ial review 
e supreme 
ew for the 
action any 
before the 
defendant. 
h need not 
ounds upon 
be served 
review or 
i ew desig-
eted serv-
11 be left 
ies of the 
s and the 
py to each 
board of 
with the 
d a trans-
the matter 
ct and de-
APPENDIX D (Page 1) 
MPH. I did not tamper with this control, but merely taped an airline 
which broke while I was on the road. I fixed i t with tape so that I could 
get back to the terminal. I offered to take a l ie detector test to 
verify that I didn't tamper with the governor, but the employer wasn't 
interested. I have since heard that this employer is checking back on 
my military records and is also trying to get something that would indicate 
that I was also involved with drug use at the time this happened. The 
airline was from the brakes and this could have caused some real problems, 
thus i t is against FICC regulations. Had I not have taped the line, I 
would have had my brakes jam up on me and i t could have caused some 
very dangerous problems. Mr. Nixon tried to get me reinstated, but the 
head office in Payette, Idaho said 'no.1 Since that time, the rumors 
of the drug charges have come up. I was not using drugs while driving 
the company trucks." Mr. Grinnell, that is signed by you, correct? 
ant Yes sir. 
Attached to that, "Air controles (sic) the brakes on a truck and I was out 
about 50 miles from the nearest town when I taped the air lines witch (sic) 
was causing the truck's brakes to lock up." 
Exhibit #4, is Mr.--is your notice Mr. Grinnell, of the denial of the 
benefits and Exhibit #5, is the request for an appeals hearing, Mr. Wilson, 
you should have a copy of this, I believe you stated that you did have a 
copy of this one, the claimant's appeal. Signature... 
n (Unintelligible) 
Okay. The signature on Exhibit 5, Mr. Grinnell is that—that is your 
signature sir? 
ant Yes sir . 
These exhibits are part of the permanent record, any comments or exceptions 
to them should be brought out during the course of our hearing this after-
noon. Now general information, f i rs t of all Mr. Grinnell, your application 
for benefits shows that you were employed by the May Truck Company from 
September 20th, 1984 to December 19th, 1985, is that correct? 
ant Yes. 
What did you do there? 
ant I was their cross-country driver. 
Okay, what was your wage? 
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aimant $.16 a mile. 
idge Now according to this you were f ired, is that right? 
laimant Yes sir. 
jdge Okay, i t is the policy of the Commission in matters of discharge to ask 
that the employer representatives explain the reasons for the discharge, 
Mr. Grinnell, you'll have a chance to ask any questions that you might have 
of those witnesses and then make your statement and bring in your witnesses. 
I do a lot of cross-examination of the claimant and witnesses in this 
regard, and both parties will have an opportunity of rebuttal statements 
and closing statements. So at this time, I'm going to ask the employer 
to explain the reasons for Mr. Grinnell1s discharge. However you choose 
to do that, Mr. Wilson, Mr. Berrett, Mr. Nixon, go ahead with that please. 
i 1 son (Uni ntel1i gi ble) 
errett Okay, I'm here Tim. 
udge We're having real troubles hearing you Mr. Wilson. 
ilson I ' l l try to speak up, is this audible? 
udge Just barely. 
ilson Well I 'M do my very best to keep speaking loudly. 
udge Okay. 
ilson Mr. Nixon, what is your t i t le with May Trucking Company? 
ixon I'm a Safety Manager. 
(ilson Where are you a Safety Manager at? 
lixon The Layton Terminal. 
lilson What do your duties include? 
lixon Basically overseeing the operation of the trucks, the maintaining of the 
equipment in a safe working order, and the way that the drivers drive 
the trucks, also the background on the drivers as to their employment, 
driver's license information and so on. 
{ilson Are you familiar with the events leading to the discharge of Mr. Grinnell? 
lixon Yes sir. 
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n When did this situation f i rst involve you? 
I believe i t was the 20th of December. 
i What happened? 
I was notified by the mechanics in the shop that one of the drivers had 
come in and mentioned something about an air leak that he had tried to 
fix himself. They told me that the air leak involved a road speed 
governor, which 1s within my department to investigate any problems 
with that area. 
n Did you have—did you physically investigate the air leak? 
Yes sir, after they had the truck in the yard, we checked to make sure 
the governor was not functioning properly. The way the governor operates 
in , in high gear in the truck, i t restricts the RPM so the engine will 
not allow the truck to go 1n excess of approximately 61 or 62 miles an 
hour. 
i When you investigated the governor, did you find that i t was not working? 
Yes I found that i t would—it was not working, that the, the engine would allow 
the RPM to go beyond that RPM range and allow excessive speed. 
i Did you find any physical problems that caused the road speed governor not 
to work? \ 
Well I directed the shop to look at i t and see i f they could find the 
problem. 
i What problem did they find? 
There's a small valve on top of the transmission, this valve is designed 
to conduct the air supply through the road speed governor. When the truck 
is placed in eighth gear, i t restricts that air supply so that the governor 
works properly. This valve, apparently, had been removed or some way tamper-
ed with. The valve itself was cracked and broken. The brass fittings go-
ing to the valve, had been removed by something other than a proper size 
wrench. I t would appear to be a pliers or a vise grip, because there are 
teeth marks in the brass and the corners are all rounded off. 
i Teeth marks, must mean a pair of pliers. 
Well, whatever was used, right. 
-5-
APPENDIX D (Page 4) 
ilson Right. What (Unintelligible) physical evidence was discovered. 
ixon Well in looking at that, i t was pretty obvious that a shop hadn't, hadn't 
done the repair where the, the—whatever had been done to that governor— 
or to that valve, I should say, because they would have used the proper 
wrench. Also one of the air lines had an extreme amount of tape on i t , 
which is an uncommon repair for a, a proper shop. 
ilson Did you confront the claimant with the evidence discovered? 
ixon Yes I did. 
ilson What was his response? 
ixon He indicated to me that he had broken an air line while he was out on the 
road, and that he fe l t i t was necessary to repair i t . And he did in-
dicate that he did remove the valve in order to make that repair, and 
that in the process of doing so, apparently, that is how i t became cracked 
and broken. He also indicated that he taped i t tryin1 to get the air leak 
to stop. 
ilson Does the May Trucking Company have a policy that explains what drivers 
are to do when they have a breakdown or a mechanic is needed on the road? 
ixon Yes sir the policy is that anytime there's a mechanical failure or break-
down on the road, they're to notify the head of maintenance in the shop in 
Payette,. Jdaho. At that point, he will direct them to a shop to have 
that—the problem repaired. We are pretty specific about drivers not 
doing their own repairs on the road. 
lilson Do they have alternate phone numbers in case the driver can't contact the 
shop itself for some reason? 
lixon Yes there's, of course the main business line going into the office in 
Payette. The driver can reach someone there from about 7:00 to 2:00 a.m. 
in the morning. The drivers are also provided with numbers to call after 
hours so they can reach someone at home. 
rfilson Before hours, are they covered? 
lixon Yes sir. 
HI son Is there any evidence, or has there been any claim that a call was made 
from the claimant. Any stock number to obtain instructions on this here? 
Jixon There was no call made. 
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n Is there any device on the tractor involved in this situation that reports 
speed, a standard method to determine at what speed i t was operating? 
Yes sir, we have a Rockwell Trip Master Computer installed on each of 
our trucks. This particular truck did have one that was Installed and 
i t was functioning at the time. 
n Did you examime the data from that on-board computer to see what the data 
looks like? 
Yes, that's standard procedure after a, especially after a situation 
where a possible tampering is Involved. I will extract the Information 
from the computer and take a look at 1t. 
n Did you personally examine the data from Mr* Grinnell's computer? 
Yes I did. Beginning on the—let me find the date here. Beginning on 
the 17th of December, I found that for a period of time, beginning about 
6:00 in the evening and going until almost 2:00 in the morning of the 
next day, there were three different periods of time where Mr. Grinnell 
averaged 66 MPH for extended periods of time. 
n Now i f the f i rst governor had not been tampered with, now what is limited 
by the operation of that devise. 
I f i t ' s functioning properly, i t should be limited to no more than 62 miles 
an hour.-. \ 
n This thing that makes this information (unintelligible) at extended periods 
of operation, average 4 or 5 miles an hour over the road governor l imit. 
That's correct. 
n What was the physical evidence found on the truck, the data, the speed 
data from the Rockwell Trip Master on-board computer? 
Well in looking at the evidence, my conclusion was that, that there was some 
possible tampering involved there, because of the combination of the 
mechanical defect that was present and also the increased speed at that 
particular time. 
n How long has Mr. Grinnell been employed by either May Trucking Company or 
May Trucking Company, Inc.? 
My records show he began employment on September 22nd, of 1984. 
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flson During his period of employment has Mr. Grinnell participated in the 
program concerning speed control? 
ixon We have a new Incentive bonus program, where i f a driver keeps his speed 
and RPH Idle time at certain levels, specifically talking about speed, 
1t would be under 60, then he is eligible for, up to $.3 a mile, as an 
additional bonus. Mr, Grinnell did participate 1n that program, he got 
his field bonus quite often. I don't think I could say he got i t eyery 
time, I think he missed i t once or twice. But 1t was somewhat unusual 
to me when I noticed on his trip reports that he had this excessive 
speed. 
ilson From the data provided by the Rockwell Trip Master computer... Let me 
back up a minute, let me ask a different question f i rs t . Did Mr. Grinnell 
have any comment concerning the air leak beyond those that you have already 
mentioned? 
ixon We had some discussion about i t , specifically what we've already entered 
into evidence by testimony, and that is the fact that he didn't bother to 
call the shop and report i t . He was aware of the fact that that's something 
that he should of done. He expressed the idea, that he was out, as he 
said, "50 miles from the nearest town." My comment was, you know, "why 
didn't you stop and report i t then, and we could have had a proper repair 
made at that time," and we had that discussion about i t , Mr. Grinnell 
really couldn't offer an explanation as to why he didn't do i t . 
ilson Could Mr..Grinnell have made i t the 50 miles into town? 
1xon The air line that was leaking 1s a very small air l ine. To give you a 
visual idea, you could probably place a standard size paper clip in the 
end of that air l ine, i t would f i l l—the hole or the gap in that air l ine. 
And that size of an air leak probably would not have affected the brakes 
as Mr. Grinnell says they would, because the compressor puts out a much 
larger volume of air than that, so i t wouldn't have created an out of 
balance situation. 
(ilson Now when you said you could f i l l the line with a paper clip, you mean you 
could f i l l the line with the wire from a paper clip is that correct? 
lixon Yes, uh huh. 
Jilson I f i t was approximately the size of a paper clip, i t would maybe be a 
quarter of an inch. 
Hxon No, just . . . 
Wilson Like a one-thirty-second because the wire would f i l l the plug. 
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Even, even smaller than that. 
i Okay. Did Mr. Grinnell make it plain about reporting the air leak to the 
staff? 
He indicated that he'd been writing it up for quite sometime. DOT require-
ments require that every day a driver complete what's called a vehicle 
inspection report. We maintain a file of all of those. I went back 
through all of his vehicle inspection reports and the only thing that I 
can find that indicates an air leak, was written up on September 20th of 
1985. Then... 
n What sort of air leak did that report log? 
I can read from the report right over into the record, it says under the 
remarks column, it says "that the truck had an exhaust leak, and an air 
leak around the battery box." That is the only comment that I've been 
able to find in his vehicle inspection reports concerning an air leak. 
n An air leak of any type? 
That's correct. 
n How long has Mr. Grinnell operated this particular... 
I started working for May Trucking Company in March last year, and I re-
call Mr.. Grinnell being on that truck at that time, so to my knowledge 
he's been on it, or had been on it, at least since March or April of 
1985. 
n So at the time of this incident it was his truck for eight or nine months. 
Yes sir. 
n So the time marked on the daily tickets was such that would result in a 
sign of carelessness, but the tampering was not concerning that air leak 
next to the battery. 
i That's the only one I could find. 
>n Okay. Does May Trucking Company have a policy about writing up daily 
probl ems? 
i Yes. 
m What is that policy? 
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xon Well the policy is, that's explained in our Employee Handbook, that the 
drivers are expected to maintain a vehicle inspection report on a daily 
basis and that those reports are to be turned in along with their paper-
work from their trip and their daily log books, so that the shop can 
have them and be aware of any mechanical problems. 
lson Is i t the same report that fu l f i l l s the U. S. Department of Transportation 
Requirements? 
xon Yes sir, I can read the exact wording from the rule book, i f you'd like me 
to. 
lson I don't think that's necessary. 
ixon Okay. 
ilson Is there other information on the Rockwell Trip Master that was out of 
the ordinary and what was that information? 
ixon Yes there was something that concerned me very much in fact. In reviewing 
Mr. Grinnell's daily trip reports, I found that earlier in his trip, in 
November, he had an extended period of driving time. DOT regulations 
will allow a driver to have up to ten hours of driving time, then they 
require an eight hour break. Mr. Grinnell drove continuously, well let 
me read to you what the results, or what the printout says, "On the 21st 
of November, he began driving at 7:26 a.m., he drove for a total of 7 hours 
and 56 minutes, he stopped the truck at 3:22 p.m., he covered a distance 
of 414 miles, the truck was stopped for 57 minutes. At 4:19 p.m., he 
started up again, drove for another 3 hours and 40 minutes. The truck 
was shut off at 7:59 after he'd driven 176 miles, and then he stopped 
for an hour and one minute, and then at 9:00 in the evening, he started 
again an drove for 9 hours and 52 minutes, shutting the truck off the next 
morning at 6 hours—or, excuse me, 6:00, 6:00 a.m. and 52 minutes, after 
driving 496 miles. His total road hours or driving time was 21 hours and 
28 minutes. The time that he spent not driving does not accumulate his 
eight hour break. In fact, he only had about two hours, really, in be-
tween there. We had a little discussion about that when Mr. Grinnell 
came in, I know he thinks that, that he was justified in doing that 
because of a dispatch situation, but the discussion that we had was, that 
he, if he wasn't aware, he should have been aware of the fact that he is 
not required or obligated by this company to break the DOT regulations. 
If... 
[ilson Let me, let me ask this question. Evidently this hours and service prob-
lem was with Mr. Grinnell? 
lixon That's correct. 
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n What was his response to that? 
Okay, his response to that was, the dispatcher had given him a load and 
that i t had to be in Stockton, California for delivery on the 22nd of November 
and he received the load on the 21st, which is unreasonable to expect any-
body to make that delivery. 
n And he claimed that he was driving excessive hours in order to make that de-
livery? 
That's correct. 
n Okay, Does May Trucking Company have a policy about what drivers are 
expected—whether drivers are expected to comply with the hours in the 
service log? 
Yes, in fact i t ' s very clear that, the DOT regulations will be complied 
with and that i f necessary, we will reschedule the load. 
n Suppose a driver was assigned a load with a delivery time that cannot be 
legally complied with. What is a driver expected to do? 
At that point the driver should talk to the dispatcher and see i f he 
will reschedule i t . I f the dispatcher refuses to reschedule i t , then 
we expect the drivers to get in touch with the Safety Department, at 
which time we will get the load rescheduled, rather than have the 
driver violate the regulations. 
n How are the drivers advised of that policy? 
They're advised of i t basically I guess you could say three ways: one way 
they're told in orientation, another way, i t ' s , i t ' s in our written poli-
cies, and the third way, i f the driver has a log book violation, he is 
mailed a warning letter which indicates very specifically on there, what 
our policies are. 
n At what time does a driver receive his oral orientation and his written rule 
book. 
He receives that before he actually becomes employed by the company. That 
is the, the very f i rst thing we do with a new driver. 
n So its basically at the time of hire? 
That's correct. 
n Okay, and this was the method of hiring drivers, entering them into the work 
force at the time Mr. Grinnell was hired? 
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xon Right. 
lson Now, prior to this particular episode did you have a lot of problems with 
Mr. Grlnnell running fast, or running extra hours? 
xon I don't recall any specific Instances of running extra hours. We did have 
a couple of times where he came 1n with excessive speed, but that was 
pretty much limited, most of the time he, he kept 1t under 60. 
ilson How would you describe the nature revealed by this data 1n tenns of his 
nonmal behavior? 
Ixon Out of the ordinary. 
(lson What was your concern, or concerns with specific problems observed from the 
data, like the extra hours, or from the concerns of erratic behavior com-
pared to his normal situation? 
ixon One of my normal concerns, not just with Mr. Grinnell but with any driver 
that can drive for sustained time, such as 21 hours and and 28 minutes, 
with only a two hour break, is that it would be difficult for anyone to do 
that without some kind of chemical assistance. Because of that I requested 
that Mr. Grinnell submit to a urinalysis for a drug screen. 
ilson Did he agree to do that? 
ixon Yes he did. 
ilson Did he complete i t though? 
ixon Yes he did? 
ilson What was the results? 
ixon Urinalysis was, the urine specimen, I should say, was examined by North-
west Toxicology, a private laboratory in Salt Lake, and their results 
showed the presence in his urine of acetaminophen which is a tylenol type 
substance, phenopropalamine, which is a decongestant, both of those 
Ingredients are commonly present in cold medi--remedies which can be 
purchased over the counter. Also the presence of cannabinoids, which 
is the active ingredient in marijuana. 
filson Did that (unintelligible) bother you? 
lixon Oh yeah. 
lilson What part of those results bothered you? Did they all bother you or was 
it the marijuana derivative? 
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Well Mike you would had to have used i t to get i t into your system. 1 , 1 , 
I'm sure you might have some, you know, different definition of that, but 
there's no way you can get i t into your system without using i t . 
Well I have a dictionary and I looked up the definition of "use, used, and 
using - as to consume or to take regularly, on a regular basis". And the 
Safety Code 392.4 states, I ' l l look i t up, "No person shall operate or be 
in physi--physical control of a motor vehicle i f he possesses, is under 
the influence of, or is using ar\y of the following substances." I feel 
I was neyer found in the possession of, I was never found under the 
influence of, and I have never used marijuana. And have you got anything 
to say, have you ever observed me under the Influence of, have you ever 
found me in possession of, or have you got witnesses that can testify 
that I was using the substance? 
I can testify that you told me that you did. We had a conversation about 
the result of the drug test and you said, I said, "does that surprise you," 
and you said, "me--well no, but would i t do me any good to explain that 
i t was only a one-time situation." 
But see i t states, "no person shall operate or be in physical control of 
a motor vehicle." That had never been brought out, I was never driving, 
never operating, or never around a motor vehicle while any of that had 
ever happened. 
Well Mike I can't explain why Greg put that in the letter, because I didn't 
type the let ter , Greg typed the letter. From my point of view, I would 
just simply say that 1t is Company policy that anyone who has used the 
drug or is using i t , is not permitted to be an employee for this company. 
I t really doesn't have anything to do with that regulation. Greg may 
have put that in the letter, and there again, Greg isn't here, I can't 
explain why he wrote that 1n the letter. You were aware that the company 
policy was that we do not have people that use narcotics or marijuana 
controlled substances. 
Just, just one point Mr. Nixon, are you saying then that all these other 
problems, the problem with the governor, the log—driving too long and 
so forth, brought up a suspension, but the actual termination—decision 
to make the termination, came when you determined that Mr. Grinnell had 
marijuana in his system, following the drug test? 
Well, what I'm saying is the combination of all of those things. Had i t not 
been for the, the positive results on the drug test, Mr. Grinnell probably 
would have had a two-week suspension and then i t would have been over 
wi th. 
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udge Would any of these others had made any difference i f you'd determined he 
had marijuana in his system? 
ixon The tampering situation is an offense for which drivers are terminated. 
udge Okay, but you say that would have probably only resulted in a suspension, 
fty question is , i f you would of determined that he had marijuana in his 
system, without any of these other problems, would he have been terminated 
for having the marijuana in his system? 
ixon Yes sir. 
udge That--so none of the rest of them really make a damn bit of difference, it's 
the marijuana in the system that matters? Excuse my language, excuse my 
language, but I want to get to the point. I've heard an awful lot of 
talking here and about two minutes of the reason for the discharge. 
lixon All those things, all those things enter in. We make it very clear to 
our employees that, that any tampering with the equipment or any drug usage 
is not tolerated, and that they will be terminated. 
ludge They--but the reason for the discharge was when you determined that 
Mr. Grinnell had been using marijuana, or that he had consumed marijuana. 
I'm not even going to go to the dictionary definition of use because I 
think that's merely a semantics question. But, but my concern here is 
that you determined that he had consumed marijuana, it was a positive 
test, he was fired as a result. The rest of those things are incidental? 
^ixon I... 
Judge I mean they may have been accumulative, but when the marijuana was de-
termined, that was the reason for termination? 
Nixon I , I agree with what you just said. I t was a accumulative situation, the 
marijuana was probably the straw that broke the camel's back. 
Judge But without any of the others, i f he would have taken a drug test, de-
termined that he had marijuana in his system, he would have been dis-
charged, correct? 
Nixon That is correct? 
Judge Okay. Any other questions Mr. Grinnell? 
Claimant Okay, all I can say is I have a witness that I've known since November 
1984, which I have lived with him, I've run team with him from the dates--
I've run team with him from March 4th, 1985, t i l l July 21st, 1985, and I've 
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known him approximately two—a year and a half now. And at any time, i f 
he, he can state the knowledge of me and drug usage, as far as he can see. 
Okay, we'll get to h is . . . 
lant Okay. 
Testimony. Let's stick with the cross-examination of Mr. Nixon at this 
point. 
ant Okay, so we determined the rest of that was not.. . 
Well, we haven't determined that i t isn' t . I—what I think we've determined 
is that you were fired for having marijuana in your system. 
ant Okay. Well concerning that, I called the Federal Motor Carrier Safety 
Regulations in Salt Lake City and I've talked to them and they said for an 
ace—accurate test for the substance of marijuana in your system, a blood 
sample would have been required also. Why wasn't I requested for a blood 
sample also? 
Are you asking me that? 
ant Yes. 
Okay, Northwest Toxicology Consultant, Inc. is the laboratory that does our 
testing, they tell us that this is a very definitive test and that further 
testing is not necessary. When the results came back positive, I asked 
them to recheck the same specimen, they came up with the same results. 
If necessary they are prepared to come in and testify and stand on their 
reputation as a credible, independent testing laboratory. 
ant Well my main concern is the urinalysis did not prove-I was operating or 
under cotrol of any vehicle while any of that occurred. And I did not 
smoke any marijuana while in any control of any motor vehicle, is my 
concern on this termination. And it's makin' it difficult for me to 
obtain employment under the statements that have been mailed out by May 
Truck Company. 
Let me ask this question Mr. Grinnell. It's a little irregular but, were 
you aware of a rule by May Truck Company, stating that if you—that it was 
against their rules to consume drugs? 
m t Well, when I was hired Steve Nixon was not the Safety Personnel. And 
the main way that the man that put that out at the time, he said, "while 
operating," he said mainly the Safety Regulation Book, he said, "while 
operating, or on the road, or any kind of control of the vehicle. In 
the vehicle, around the vehicle, or anything concerning the truck, there 
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dge Okay, just following up on that particular point, Mr. Berrett, and make sure 
i t ' s clear in my mind. You say that when the test was administered to 
Mr. Grinnell i t was approximately two weeks after the claimant had last 
driven a vehicle? 
Trett No, no. That he had been out on the road for approximately two weeks. I'm 
just quessing, but normally i t ' s about two weeks that they're out on the road. 
idge Uh huh. 
jrrett And he'd come back in, and then the tests and everything had happened at 
that point. 
jdge Okay, now when in, when in, in approximal time to the actual administering 
of the test, had Mr. Grinnell actu—last driven a May Trucking Company 
vehicle? 
>rrett Well, hold on a second, let me see if I can find that information here. 
Hold on just a second, I'll have to check... 
jdge All right. 
errett He had driven—come in on the 20th of December... 
udge In... 
errett Drug, dn*g test was on—conducted on the 24th of December. 
udge So there were—there was four days between the time that he had actually 
last driven and the administering of the test? 
errett That would be correct, uh huh. 
udge Are, are you familiar with the test? 
errett Because i t came in on the 20th—the administration of the test was on 
the 24th. 
udge Okay, are you familiar with the test administered to Mr. Grinnell in this 
case? 
•errett In what respect? 
udge Well, I guess the question that I have... 
(errett Let me, let me say—see i f I can answer that for you. The test is administered 
by Clearfield Medical Clinic. 
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>tt I , I think you did, yes. I don't have that information at my finger tips, 
but I think you did. 
lant Well i f I was using drugs and such as I'm claimed to have been, how 
would I have been able to maintain no accidents within a year's time 
of drivin'? 
>tt Mike the reason you were not terminated because of the tampering which 
we found, immediately at that point, was because you had been a good 
driver, and we wanted to give you, give you eyery9 every chance we pos-
sibly could. And that's the reason you weren't immediately, immediately 
terminated at that point. Had that happened to someone who had an ac-
cident too, they would have been out the door at that point, Mike. 
And so i t really, how you were able to do that, 1 , 1 , don't know, I 
don't have the slightest Idea how, how that was. I t ' s possible maybe 
you aren't a frequent user, I don't know, but the chance that you 
would be, is not something we want--we are going to take. 
lant Okay* 
Okay. Mr. Grinnell, do you have any comments? 
ant You mean like a closing statement? 
No, just any comments. You haven't really made a statement yet, although 
you've... 
ant Okay. 
In your questions there have been some statements. At this point I'm 
going to give you a chance to respond to the things that have been said 
here and so on. You've heard the reason for the discharge. 
ant For the usage of . . . 
Right, 
ant Drugs. 
That's what I want you to stick with. That's.. . 
ant Okay. I've read through the Safety Regulation Book which is an issued 
item to all drivers who are hired on at May. 
Okay, let me stop you just a minute. Mr. Wilson, can you hear Mr. Grinnell? 
n No I cannot. 
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udge Okay. 
ilson Mr. Grinnell, during the trip when you were out on the road in the company 
truck, including ar\ything associated with i t , did you consume marijuana? 
laimant No. 
lilson You say you didn't consume marijuana. Did this include all the times in 
which you le f t the terminal to the time when you got back in and had the 
problem with the road speed governor? In other words, I'm not just 
asking you when you were physically on the truck, but when you were out 
in association with your duties, operating the vehicle, and being next to 
the vehicle and all the things you do when you're on the road, did you 
consume marijuana? 
Claimant No, I did not. 
Wilson Between the time that you returned to the terminal and when you were told 
you would need a urinalysis, at the time that you actually reported at 
your own convenience and took the test, did you consume marijuana during 
that interval? 
Claimant What was that question? 
Judge 1 , 1 , 1 understood the question, I believe Mr. Wilson. From the time 
that you returned, that would have been the 20th of December, until 
the time that you took the test on the 24th of December, did you consume 
marijuana? 
Claimant No, I did not. 
Judge Did you hear the answer Mr. Wilson? 
Wilson No I didn't. 
Judge He said, "no, he did not." 
Wilson Okay. I don't have any other questions of Mr. Grinnell• 
Judge Okay. Mr. Wilson, do you have anything that you would care to state in 
closing? 
Wilson Yes. 
Judge Okay, go ahead with that please? 
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Let's see, Mr. Grlnnell was terminated 1n connection with other activities 
that occurred. Now I'm aware of the letter where Mr. Welgel Indicated 
that he was suspended and then he was terminated later. But quite 
frankly I regret the Inarticulate statement of how things occurred. At 
the time Mr. Grlnnell le f t the terminal, he was aware that the minimum 
penalty that he would receive would be a two-weeks' suspension and that 
the company was concerned that drug use had occurred 1n connection with 
the operation of the vehicle. The test that Mr. Grinnell, that 1n fact 
the tests concluded what amounts to a grace period where the (unintelligible) 
of the test, such substances resulting from marijuana use, but i t , the 
laboratory regards that the small amount would not detect recent use so i t 
gives him a grace period. And with the grace period the test proved to be 
positive. Mr. Grinnel was aware of what policies he had violated. He 
was aware that the hours and service call had been violated. His contra-
dictory testimony was that he violated the drugs policy, but i t appears 
that i f there was drugs present in Mr. Grinnell and that i t wasn't after 
he l e f t May Trucking Company, that i t occurred on the last tr ip. And so 
a combination of those things indicated that Mr. Grinnell was performing 
his job in a manner that was a hazard and not beneficial to operate cars 
or trucks 29 hours in a row, at speeds of 66 miles an hour. As long as 
i t is a company rule that i t is against the rules to violate Federal and 
State law, and so we find that Mr. Grinnel was operating this vehicle in a 
manner that is contrary to the law, the laws of the State. There was an 
hours and service problem, and that he appeared to be playing with drugs 
and that he not have, that the core of this eradic operation would seem 
to have occurred extemporaneously and, therefore, he was terminated. 
Okay sir, thank you. Mr. Grinnell, anything in closing? 
Okay, concerning the letters I received as reasons of termination, are 
different than the verbal ones, and the main issue was a drug usage, and 
I don't think May Trucking has sufficient evidence to prove my drug usage 
or any habit forming or addiction to the drugs. So -I feel under the grounds 
that I was unjust—unjustly discharged. 
I'm going to consider the evidence and testimony presented before this hear-
ing and a determination, Mr. Grinnell, will be made to establish whether 
you're entitled to unemployment insurance benefits. I'm going to advise that 
you continue to actively seek employment and i f you are not currently employ-
ed, I'm also going to advise that you continue to f i le your weekly claim 
forms, at least until such time as a decision is made to determine your en-
titlement to those benefits. I t will be a week to ten days before that 
decision is published. A copy will go to both parties. We'll determine 
also, whether or not the employer is subject to charges in regards to their 
account. Both parties will be advised of ar\y further appeal rights that they 
have. There's nothing further then, I am going to close this hearing. 
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V.Hichael Francis Grinftell * ~ i . *— .u. a. w -lfiA *° %*** 
- __—. Social Security Number. Social Security Number. 
ui Information: i vas discharged for allegedly tampering with the governor on the truck 
*™
 ,nfQffflftflc^:vas driving, >Thie i n devise that keeps the truck speed atr 60 MPH. -a* 
lid not tamper with ttvis control Tl>ut merely taped an a ir l ine which-broke while 
[ was on the road. I fixed i t with tape so that I could get back to the terminal. 
[ offered to take "ar }ie.^dft$ctor test to verify, that I didn|t tamper with the 
governor, but the^employer wasn't interested. I*have 'einck heard that this 
employer i s checking batkoa my military records and ite al*o-trying to get 
lomething that would indicate that I was also Involved with drug use at the 
time tlvia happened. The. airTlrye was from, the brakes end could have caused 
some real pro\>lem|, plufe it\i&" agaihst* FICC regulations* Had I.not have taped 
the l ine) I would hav^hadmy brakes'jam'up o*n me and i t - could have caused some 
very dangerous problemsX Mr* Nixon tried to get me reinstated, but the head office 
in .Payette, Idaho said "no." ^Since~that time, the rumors of the drug charges 
Kflv '^rnmo -r> •T,iW<rnnf ucstriflr <lru«s while.driving*the company trucksJ 
Vtw/k 
^fQ. nearest 4Dt*^>v\'loWrv i : •Vafxyi 4We_ 
brakes +& lock UP. 
